Trade and Employment From Myths to Facts - International Labour ...
Trade and Employment From Myths to Facts - International Labour ...
Trade and Employment From Myths to Facts - International Labour ...
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Chapter 2: New evidence on trade <strong>and</strong> employment: An overview<br />
tioned in the introduction: trade <strong>and</strong> employment in general equilibrium; asymmetric<br />
bargaining power; trade liberalization when unemployment is already high;<br />
the quality of jobs; <strong>and</strong> trade in tasks.<br />
2.3.1 The general equilibrium effects of trade on employment are<br />
significant<br />
In a study of the South African economy, Rodrik (2006) notes that South Africa’s<br />
unemployment rate (between 24 <strong>and</strong> 40 per cent) is one of the highest in the world.<br />
Many observers blame the unions for excessively high wages <strong>and</strong> thus unemployment.<br />
However, Rodrik finds that the root cause of high unemployment in South<br />
Africa is not the unions but the shrinkage of the manufacturing sec<strong>to</strong>r since the<br />
early 1990s. According <strong>to</strong> Rodrik, the weak performance of the export-oriented manufacturing<br />
sec<strong>to</strong>r has deprived South Africa of job creation at the relatively low end<br />
of the skill distribution. Econometrically, Rodrik shows that import penetration is<br />
one of the key fac<strong>to</strong>rs behind weak performance of the export-oriented manufacturing<br />
sec<strong>to</strong>r.<br />
In a study of the Brazilian economy, Menezes-Filho <strong>and</strong> Muendler (2007)<br />
combine insights from the Melitz (2003) model with worker heterogeneity providing<br />
a compelling empirical example of the importance of some of the more recent theoretical<br />
breakthroughs. These authors link worker-level panel data with firm-level<br />
data <strong>and</strong> industry-level data <strong>to</strong> obtain a rich dataset that allows them <strong>to</strong> test many<br />
implications of the most advanced trade models (for example, heterogeneous-firm<br />
models that incorporate heterogeneous labour) for Brazil. By doing this, the authors<br />
are able <strong>to</strong> assess the impact of Brazil’s trade liberalization during the 1990s on jobs,<br />
while controlling for a number of worker-specific, firm-specific, industry-specific,<br />
<strong>and</strong> economy-wide structural reforms. Their dataset allows them <strong>to</strong> follow workers<br />
throughout the liberalization period <strong>and</strong> observe the path of their employment his<strong>to</strong>ry<br />
in greater detail than previous studies. They are particularly interested in the<br />
effects of trade liberalization on employment status, type of employment (formal<br />
or informal), <strong>and</strong> job reallocations.<br />
Their results show that firms in industries with a “comparative-advantage” 15<br />
<strong>and</strong> exporting firms16 shed workers more frequently. Moreover, firms with comparative<br />
advantage <strong>and</strong> exporting firms also hire workers less frequently than the average<br />
firm. Thus, on net, trade liberalization leads <strong>to</strong> net employment losses in these<br />
firms. This is surprising given the st<strong>and</strong>ard predictions of international trade models<br />
that would indicate that these sec<strong>to</strong>rs <strong>and</strong> firms would potentially hire more workers<br />
when liberalization occurs. Furthermore, they also show that tariff reductions <strong>and</strong><br />
increased import penetration are associated with an increase in the likelihood of a<br />
15 Those industries where Brazil has a comparative advantage with respect <strong>to</strong> the rest of the world.<br />
The authors use UN COMTRADE data from 1986–98 <strong>to</strong> calculate sec<strong>to</strong>ral-level comparative<br />
advantage measures following Balassa (1965).<br />
16 Which may or may not be firms in industries with a sec<strong>to</strong>ral comparative advantage.<br />
37