Trade and Employment From Myths to Facts - International Labour ...
Trade and Employment From Myths to Facts - International Labour ...
Trade and Employment From Myths to Facts - International Labour ...
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Chapter 2: New evidence on trade <strong>and</strong> employment: An overview<br />
association between trade liberalization <strong>and</strong> labour market outcomes at the industry<br />
level. This is an indication that, within the industrial sec<strong>to</strong>r, labour rigidities are not<br />
<strong>to</strong>o strong <strong>and</strong>, thus, labour can relocate within manufacturing relatively easily.<br />
Ebenstein et al. (2009) go on <strong>to</strong> show that labour is not as mobile across occupations.<br />
Their results suggest, at least for the United States, that a 1 percentage point increase<br />
in occupation-specific import competition is associated with a 0.25 percentage point<br />
decline in real wages. While some occupations have experienced no increase in<br />
import competition (such as teachers), import competition in some occupations<br />
(such as shoe manufacturing) has increased by as much as 40 percentage points. The<br />
downward pressure on wages due <strong>to</strong> import competition has been commonly overlooked<br />
in the literature because it operates between <strong>and</strong> not within industries.<br />
The magnitudes of the effects appear <strong>to</strong> be important. The authors report that<br />
<strong>to</strong>tal employment in manufacturing fell from 22 million <strong>to</strong> 17 million, with the<br />
steepest declines in the early 1980s. Total employment for the least-skilled workers<br />
(with a high-school diploma or less), declined over the entire period, while employment<br />
for workers with at least a college degree increased in all but the last three<br />
years of the sample. Additionally, real hourly wages fell for workers with a highschool<br />
education or less, while manufacturing workers with at least a college degree<br />
realized the largest wage gains. In terms of offshoring trends, offshore employment<br />
as a percentage of <strong>to</strong>tal employment of US multinational firms increased from 28<br />
per cent in 1982 <strong>to</strong> 36 per cent in 2002; these increases occurred concurrent <strong>to</strong> a<br />
reduction in the US workforce for these firms, from 12 million workers in 1982 <strong>to</strong><br />
7 million in 2002. The authors find significant relocation of workers across industries<br />
due <strong>to</strong> import competition <strong>and</strong> smaller responses of employment <strong>to</strong> offshoring.<br />
Finally, the authors find that a 1 percentage point increase in import penetration is<br />
associated with a 0.6 percentage point decrease in manufacturing employment in<br />
the United States; they observe an increase of nearly 8 percentage point in import<br />
penetration for this country, which would explain almost 5 per cent of the reduction<br />
of employment in manufacturing. They also note that this effect has been felt more<br />
strongly by workers with a high-school education or less.<br />
2.3.2 <strong>Labour</strong> has lost bargaining power relative <strong>to</strong> capital<br />
Numerous reports in the popular press describe the decline in labour’s share of<br />
income as an outcome of a struggle between capital <strong>and</strong> labour, with owners of capital<br />
winning at the expense of labour. These accounts typically present owners of capital<br />
as having greater bargaining power compared <strong>to</strong> labour, ostensibly because capital is<br />
footloose <strong>and</strong> can quickly relocate <strong>to</strong> wherever it can find the highest returns. For<br />
example, The New York Times quotes Stephen Roach of Morgan Stanley, who points<br />
out that “… the share of national income going <strong>to</strong> the owners of capital through<br />
corporate profits is surging. The share going <strong>to</strong> labour compensation is falling. This<br />
is not the way a democracy is supposed <strong>to</strong> work ...”. Rodrik (1997) describes a similar<br />
type of bargaining game between capital <strong>and</strong> labour. Some observers have even suggested<br />
that this increase in capital mobility has made workers in both receiving <strong>and</strong><br />
39