30.01.2013 Views

Trade and Employment From Myths to Facts - International Labour ...

Trade and Employment From Myths to Facts - International Labour ...

Trade and Employment From Myths to Facts - International Labour ...

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

Chapter 2: New evidence on trade <strong>and</strong> employment: An overview<br />

association between trade liberalization <strong>and</strong> labour market outcomes at the industry<br />

level. This is an indication that, within the industrial sec<strong>to</strong>r, labour rigidities are not<br />

<strong>to</strong>o strong <strong>and</strong>, thus, labour can relocate within manufacturing relatively easily.<br />

Ebenstein et al. (2009) go on <strong>to</strong> show that labour is not as mobile across occupations.<br />

Their results suggest, at least for the United States, that a 1 percentage point increase<br />

in occupation-specific import competition is associated with a 0.25 percentage point<br />

decline in real wages. While some occupations have experienced no increase in<br />

import competition (such as teachers), import competition in some occupations<br />

(such as shoe manufacturing) has increased by as much as 40 percentage points. The<br />

downward pressure on wages due <strong>to</strong> import competition has been commonly overlooked<br />

in the literature because it operates between <strong>and</strong> not within industries.<br />

The magnitudes of the effects appear <strong>to</strong> be important. The authors report that<br />

<strong>to</strong>tal employment in manufacturing fell from 22 million <strong>to</strong> 17 million, with the<br />

steepest declines in the early 1980s. Total employment for the least-skilled workers<br />

(with a high-school diploma or less), declined over the entire period, while employment<br />

for workers with at least a college degree increased in all but the last three<br />

years of the sample. Additionally, real hourly wages fell for workers with a highschool<br />

education or less, while manufacturing workers with at least a college degree<br />

realized the largest wage gains. In terms of offshoring trends, offshore employment<br />

as a percentage of <strong>to</strong>tal employment of US multinational firms increased from 28<br />

per cent in 1982 <strong>to</strong> 36 per cent in 2002; these increases occurred concurrent <strong>to</strong> a<br />

reduction in the US workforce for these firms, from 12 million workers in 1982 <strong>to</strong><br />

7 million in 2002. The authors find significant relocation of workers across industries<br />

due <strong>to</strong> import competition <strong>and</strong> smaller responses of employment <strong>to</strong> offshoring.<br />

Finally, the authors find that a 1 percentage point increase in import penetration is<br />

associated with a 0.6 percentage point decrease in manufacturing employment in<br />

the United States; they observe an increase of nearly 8 percentage point in import<br />

penetration for this country, which would explain almost 5 per cent of the reduction<br />

of employment in manufacturing. They also note that this effect has been felt more<br />

strongly by workers with a high-school education or less.<br />

2.3.2 <strong>Labour</strong> has lost bargaining power relative <strong>to</strong> capital<br />

Numerous reports in the popular press describe the decline in labour’s share of<br />

income as an outcome of a struggle between capital <strong>and</strong> labour, with owners of capital<br />

winning at the expense of labour. These accounts typically present owners of capital<br />

as having greater bargaining power compared <strong>to</strong> labour, ostensibly because capital is<br />

footloose <strong>and</strong> can quickly relocate <strong>to</strong> wherever it can find the highest returns. For<br />

example, The New York Times quotes Stephen Roach of Morgan Stanley, who points<br />

out that “… the share of national income going <strong>to</strong> the owners of capital through<br />

corporate profits is surging. The share going <strong>to</strong> labour compensation is falling. This<br />

is not the way a democracy is supposed <strong>to</strong> work ...”. Rodrik (1997) describes a similar<br />

type of bargaining game between capital <strong>and</strong> labour. Some observers have even suggested<br />

that this increase in capital mobility has made workers in both receiving <strong>and</strong><br />

39

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!