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Russia, in turn, in its “Mid-Term Strategy of Relations with the EU”, which should be in force until
2010, neither went beyond stating tactical goals. The only strategic statement to be found in the
document says that Russia has no plan to seek EU membership, which, as common sense would tell,
can hardly be a basis for a productive long-term agenda.
To be fair, though, the working assumption in the EU in the 1990’s and early 2000’s,
however rosy and naïve, was rather benevolent vis-à-vis Russia. The EU expected Russia some day
to successfully complete the process of transformation and to adapt its own rules similar to those
used in the EU, which would allow the two entities to come closer together. The rhetoric of “Russia’s
European Choice” often used by Vladimir Putin in his early years as the President of Russia gave birth
to new hopes in this respect.
By the end of his second term in offi ce, this assumption seems to have been sent to the
graveyard. Russia has shelved or even totally abandoned the “European Choice”, understood as
following the EU in its path to modernization and giving priority to cooperation with the EU over
the USA or Asian countries. Instead, it attempted to restore its own status as a global actor, equal
and certainly not inferior to EU in any way, and to deny EU’s monopoly on the notion of “Europe” in
international relations.
At the moment, there are two large conceptual issues on which clarity is absent, enormously
affecting policy planning and adding to the strategic uncertainty in the relations between the EU and
Russia. The fi rst one is the low predictability of the future of Russia. Will the stabilization, achieved
during Putin’s presidency prevail in the years to come, or will the halt of economic reforms, made
possible thanks to high energy prices, rampant corruption, crime, rise of xenophobia, worrying
demographic trends and other social diseases, again destabilize the state over time? Will the post-
Putin Russia be willing and able to remain pragmatically cooperative with the West, or will it, on the
contrary, go back to more confrontational attitudes, regardless of whether they will stem from a poor
state’s nationalism or a rich and strong state’s assertiveness? Unfortunately, each of these outcomes
can be foreseen.
The second issue is the notorious question of the fi nal borders of the EU. Did the EU fi nally
say “No” to further enlargement towards the East and irreversibly deprive itself of the megainstrument
of bringing change, which is in the membership perspective? Does it plan to retrench
to the “Fortress Europe” that would inevitably imply the absolute priority of the current border as
a “sacred frontier of the civilization” and “Othering” of all remaining eastern neighbours, including
Russia, or does it intend to make these relationships as cooperative as possible and aimed at