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incremental integration? Until more clarity emerges on these variables, the feeling of a point of
destination in the Russian-EU relations is very unlikely to appear8 .
Meanwhile, the relationship is facing a number of growing controversies. Again, in the strategic
sense, the most important one is the so-called value gap. When values differ, an ad hoc cooperation
is possible, but a strategic alliance, let alone integration, is not. The EU is based on its members’
allegiance to the liberal and democratic values, political freedoms and the rule of law. Concerning
Russia, it can no longer be denied that the state is de-democratizing, that the concentration of
power in the presidential offi ce has essentially destroyed the system of the separation of powers,
that independent media fi nds itself under severe pressure from the authorities, and that Russia’s
positions in authoritative international ratings that measure the state of freedoms and human rights
are at a very low level – lower that those of many third-world countries. This gap can no longer be
ignored inside the EU, as doing so would undermine the credibility of its policy of democratization
elsewhere and would expose the governments to criticism by the human rights community
domestically.
The problem, however, is that in 2004, when the trend towards Russia’s de-democratization
was no less obvious than today, the EU made the decision to give priority in relations with Russia
to the so-called “pragmatic common interests”, paying only a lip service to the “common values”.
Whether this was or was not done in expectation of economic trade offs – access to Russian
upstream energy market in particular – is no longer worth discussing. But the very possibility of such
an interpretation makes the task of addressing the issue of democracy and human rights in Russia
very diffi cult for the EU, as an impression has been created that the EU’s concern was not genuine,
but expressed either as a bargaining chip to be exchanged for economic concessions of Russia or to
satisfy the domestic audience.
Yet, the expectation that the emphasis on the common interests will bear fruit was generally
futile. The energy sector, cooperation in which was supposed to bind Russia and the EU together
and push the cooperation forward, has, on the contrary, become a knot of most irreconcilable
contradictions. In 2006 Russian gas monopoly Gazprom was not allowed to purchase a British
company Centrica, which sent a clear signal of the unwillingness of important EU countries to grant
8 On the matrix of possible scenarios see S. Medvedev. “EU-Russian Relations. Alternative Futures.” FIIA Report 15, Helsinki,
2006.
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