Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967 - NASA's History Office

ASTRONAUTICS AND AERONAUTICS, 1967 April 10-13
Philco-Ford Corp. and General Dynamics Corp. both displayed sev-
eral monitoring devices which had grown out of technology acquired
by NASA in the development of remote sensing equipment for astronauts.
The corporations indicated they would attempt to market the devices
for use in medical sciences. (Tech Wk, 4!17/67, 22)
Dr. Charles F. Gell, chief scientist of Submarine Medical Research
Laboratory at U.S. Naval Submarine Medical Center, received Eric J.
Liljencrantz Award and $500 honorarium for his contributions to the
advancement of aeronautics and space sciences through medical research.
(Av Wk, 4/24/67,121)
April 11: Apollo 204 Review Board, accompanied by NASA Administrator
James E. Webb, testified before Senate Committee on Aeronautical and
Space Sciences. Key Board members summarized the Board’s findings
and recommendations. Astronaut Frank Borman, asked if he believed
U.S. decision to use 100% oxygen atmosphere in spacecraft had been
influenced by a desire to achieve first manned lunar landing, replied:
“. . . never since I have been associated with NASA have I ever experi-
enced any decision where a known detriment to crew safety was sacri-
ficed to any operational requirement. And although I am willing to
accept risk . . . I am not willing personally to accept undue risk and I
would not participate in any decision which I thought was expediting
a program in an unsafe manner. And in the final analysis the crew is
the Review Board because if we do not like the way the spacecraft is
configured, we don’t have to get in.” Borman said if on Jan. 27 he had
had the information accumulated by the Board, he would not have
entered the Apollo spacecraft because: (1) the test had not been classi-
fied as hazardous; (2) the spacecraft contained too many combustibles;
(3) the wire that provided the5gnition source was vulnerable. Borman
said he would be “willing and eager” to enter a 100% oxygen Apollo
spacecraft which incorporated Board’s recommended improvements.
(Testimony; Transcript, 181,209-10,258)
In testimony before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics’
Subcommittee on NASA Oversight, North American Aviation President
J. Leland Atwood denied that pressures to meet 1970 lunar-landing goal
had prompted NAA engineers to take shortcuts in Apollo program. Term-
ing the Apollo 204 Review Board’s study “a good and penetrating re-
port,” Atwood conceded that deficiencies existed in the Apollo capsule,
but disputed Board’s charge that “deficiencies existed in Command Mod-
ule design, workmanship, and quality control. . . .” NAA’S Director of
Research and Engineering Dr. John F. McCarthy said that although an
electrical arc “probably” caused the fire, there were ‘tarious other
possibilities”--such as Astronaut Gus Grissom accidentally kicking loose
a wire that could have later initiated the blaze. Under stern questioning
by subcommittee members, however, Dr. McCarthy admitted that this
theory was pure speculation.
In response to charge by Rep. William F. Ryan (D-N.Y.) that pre-
vailing attitude prior YO fire was not “just a feeling of over-confidence”
but “real negligence” by NAA and NASA, Atwood reasserted that the most
serious error made by NAA and NASA was classification of the AS-204
test as “non-hazardous.” Questioned about the reasoning behind design-
ing to minimize fire hazard, Dr. McCarthy pointed out that NAA had
concentrated on eliminating possible ignition sources while it turned
out that the amount and placement of flammable materials was crucial.
105