Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967 - NASA's History Office

April 11 ASTRONAUTICS AND AERONAUTICS, 1967
He characterized this as a “grave error in judgment.” Atwood assured the
Subcommittee that NAA and NASA had “placed great stress” on the im-
portance of quality and workmanship: “The procedures followed and
the depth of inspection which have been employed far surpass those . . .
used on any other program. The fact of the accident itself makes it
obvious that we must do more than we have done, that we must-guided
by the finding of the board-redouble our efforts to approach perfection.
Already we have gone over every other design feature of the spacecraft
to identify any other area of possible failures . . . [and] we have found
none.” (NYT, 4/12/67,34; W Star, 4/12/67, A6)
* New York Times commented on Apollo 204 Review Board‘s final report on
Jan. 27 flash fire: “TWO months ago, on the basis of the incomplete
evidence then available, we suggested that the Apollo catastrophe had
taken place because ‘many men miscalculated-grossly .’ The official
report . . . suggests that that conclusion was too kind . . . [since] the
report -_ convicts those in charge of Project Apollo of incompetence and
negligence.
“The core of the problem is indicated in the board’s fifth finding:
‘Those organizations responsible for the planning, conduct and safety
of this test failed to identify it as being hazardous. Contingency preparations
to permit escape or rescue of the crew from an internal command
module fire were not made.’
“How could those in charge of the test have ‘failed to identify it as
being hazardous?’ The three astronauts had been put into what even a
high school chemistry student would know was a potential oxygen
incendiary bomb, one needing only a spark to initiate catastrophe. . . .
But at Cape Kennedy, in the report’s words, ‘No procedures for this
type of emergency had been established either for the crew or for the
spacecraft pad work team.’
“The incredible complacency thus revealed overshadows even the
other disgraceful and disheartening findings of the review board. . . .
And as the record of incompetence and careless work-devastating in
its impact-is recited in the report, one wonders how many of the previous
manned space flights succeeded rather than how the Apollo tragedy
occurred. . . .” (NYT, 4/11/67,44M)
* Lunar Orbiter III, launched Feb. 4, had sent full photographic coverage
of six primary Apollo sites west of 20” east longitude and partial coverage,
including high-resolution photographs, of six remaining sites in east.
One objective had been to photograph a landed Surveyor with sufficient
resolution to detect the spacecraft. NASA-appointed study group established
location of image on Lunar Orbiter photographs that fitted all
Surveyor I identification criteria. (NASA Proj Off)
* NASA Nike-Cajun sounding rocket launched from Wallops Station carried
GsFc-instrumented grenade payload to 78-mi ( 126-km) altitude to obtain
data on temperature, pressure, density, and wind between 22-59 mi (35-
95 km) at transition from winter-time westerly to summer-time easterly
circulation. Rocket was planned as companion shot with Nike-Cajun
launched from Point Barrow, Alaska, April 10. Weather conditions at
Wallops Station prevented launch on same day. Rocket and instrumentation
performed satisfactorily. (NASA Rpt SRL)
FAA proposed that current noise abatement rules covering large aircraft
be applied also to small turbine-powered aircraft. Many turbine-powered
aircraft were not included under the large transport category, but
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