Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967 - NASA's History Office

November 29 ASTRONAUTICS AND AERONAUTICS, 1967
NASA awarded General Dynamics Corp. a oneyear, $&21.1-million, costplus-award-fee
contract to provide management and engineering services
for Centaur launch vehicle, ending Sept. 30,1968. This vehicle had been
used successfully to launch six Surveyor spacecraft and would continue
in use for lunar and planetary as well as earth orbital missions. LeRC
was Centaur project manager. (LeRc Release 67-72)
November 30: Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) , Chairman, Senate Committee
on Armed Services’ Nuclear Safeguards Subcommittee, reported
from Senate floor that “Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty safeguards [were]
being supported and implemented in a satisfactory manner.” He said
that recent Soviet; and Chinese missile and nuclear developments had
formed “serious challenge to the strategic Superiority of US. power on
which our defense planners have counted to maintain political stability
and to keep the peace.” Sen. Jackson listed two prime requirements to
maintain US. strategic superiority. First would be strategic offensive
capability to penetrate Soviet ABM defenses using new generations of
land-based ICBMS and nuclear submarines with better missiles and
using MIRvs. Second requirement would be the best ABM defense to
protect US. retaliatory second-strike force, to safeguard American
people, and to account for allies’ needs. He cited seriousness of Soviet’s
doubling ICBMS, developing orbital nuclear bombs, and deploying ABM
system around MOSCOW, especially when combined with growing Com-
munist Chinese nuclear threat. (Text)
* DOD was studying contract performance under its letter contract with
Pratt & Whitney for F-111 engines. Orr Kelly, reporting in Washington
Star, stated, “The Defense Dept. has ordered a high-level investigation
of [Pratt & Whitney operations] in an effort to cut [F-111 engine costs],
Pentagon sources said today.” A firm price had not been set-final con-
tract negotiations would begin in early 196Cbut negotiation and fact-
finding teams, headed by Asst. Secretary of Navy for Installations and
Logistics Graeme C. Bannerman, Chief of Naval Material Adm. I. J.
Galantin, and Procurement Control and Clearance Div. Chief Gordon
W. Rule would continue to work for final contract containing “target
costs, profits and prices to the government.” Rising costs were reflected
in history of F-111 engine procurement: 1961 cost estimate, $270,000;
1965 Pratt & Whitney ceiling price for British government, $400,000;
1966 Pratt & Whitney letter contract estimates to US. Government,
$700,000 to $750,000. Article stated that negotiations on price of engine
were “not related to the quality;” further, negotiations would not delay
aircraft’s development, according to a Navy official. DOD sources em-
phasized price differences could not be taken “as a full measure of the
rise in price because there have been significant improvements in the
engine, giving it greater thrust, since 1961.” After letter contract was
signed, Naval Air Systems Command had asked the Performance Tech-
nology Corp. to make an independent investigation of Pratt & Whitney
operations. At issue were 2,053 TF-30 engines manufactured in four-
year period 1967-1970. (Kelly, W Star, 11/30/67, 1)
0 AFSC announced that inertial navigation systems of several contractors
were receiving first-phase ground testing before second-phase flight test-
ing in jet cargo test-bed aircraft, in AMSA program for advanced devel-
opment of components for next generation of manned bombers. Central
Inertial Guidance Test Facility ( CIGTF) of AFMDC was testing systems in
specially built van that made daily trips on “uneven” public highways.
360