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Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967 - NASA's History Office

Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967 - NASA's History Office

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ASTRONAUTICS AND AERONAUTICS, <strong>1967</strong> April 17<br />

they should have done, but I can say the same thing about us at NASA.”<br />

He stated his conviction that he was obligated to “act responsibly in<br />

respecting confidences between himself <strong>and</strong> contractors.~’ Denying that<br />

undue risks were taken in order to speed the program, Webb emphasized<br />

that NASA had “never put schedule above safety.” Apollo 2044 Review<br />

Board’s study was “a good report,” he said, but it should not be con-<br />

strued to be an evaluation of the entire space program: “The board has<br />

done an outst<strong>and</strong>ing investigation of one accident but it is not a full <strong>and</strong><br />

fair appraisal of the space program . . . [<strong>and</strong>] cannot be taken as a guide<br />

to the realities of this program. . . .” In response to questioning Webb<br />

stated that, in his judgment, the pacing item in the manned lunar l<strong>and</strong>-<br />

ing program remained the Saturn V booster, <strong>and</strong> when it was ready for<br />

manned flight there would be a spacecraft ready.<br />

Committee Chairman Clinton P. Anderson (D-N.Mex.) requested<br />

that NASA witnesses appear again not later than May 9 to detail changes<br />

the program, as suggested by Webb. (Wilford, NYT, 4/18/67, C26;<br />

O’Toole, W Post, 4/18/67, Al; SBD, 4/18/67, 275)<br />

Astronauts Donald K. Slayton, Alan B. Shepard, Walter M. Schirra, Jr.,<br />

Frank Borman, <strong>and</strong> James A. McDivitt, testifying before the House<br />

Committee on Science <strong>and</strong> <strong>Astronautics</strong>’ Subcommittee on NASA Oversight,<br />

expressed confidence in NASA’s management of U.S. space program.<br />

They noted that there had been only one mishap in the program, compared<br />

with 16 successful manned flights under the same management.<br />

Since fire had been foreseen as a significant danger in orbit but not on<br />

the launch pad before fueling of the launch vehicle, everyone had been<br />

‘‘lulled into a sense of false security . . , [<strong>and</strong>] grossly underestimated<br />

the fire potential of the spacecraft,” they said. Schirra explained confidence<br />

astronauts felt prior to the fire Jan. 27: “The back-up crew [of<br />

which Schirra was comm<strong>and</strong>er] had left the Cape with the feeling that<br />

we had a good spacecraft behind us. . . . I was not at all prepared for<br />

the news I received when I arrived at Houston.” (Hines, W Star,<br />

4/18/67, 1)<br />

April 17-20: Some of the more important preliminary results from NASA’s<br />

interplanetary spacecraft Pioneer F’Z {launched Dee. 16,1965) <strong>and</strong> VZZ<br />

(launched Aug. 17, 1966) were presented at American Geophysical<br />

Union’s 48th annual meeting in Washington, D.C. Spacecraft, which had<br />

flown almost 200 million mi in their solar orbits, had provided: (1) better<br />

definition of solar atmosphere; (2) additional data on solar wind; <strong>and</strong><br />

(3) improved measurement of earth’s magnetosphere. Report by ARC<br />

scientists Dr. John H. Wolfe, R. W. Silva, <strong>and</strong> D. D. McKibbin indicated<br />

that magnetosphere ends about 3.5 million mi from earth going away<br />

from the sun; previous estimates had varied from 240,000 mi to 100<br />

million mi. (NASA Release 674%)<br />

April 18: NASA Administrator James E. Webb submitted summary of M/G<br />

Samuel Phillips’ (USAF) report on North American Aviation, Inc.’s<br />

workmanship (the “Phillips Report”) to the Senate Committee on Aeronautical<br />

<strong>and</strong> Space Sciences: “Our main criticism was that the Space<br />

<strong>and</strong> Information Division was overmanned <strong>and</strong> that the S-I1 <strong>and</strong> CSM<br />

programs could be done, <strong>and</strong> done better by fewer people, better organized<br />

with particular emphasis on achieving greater competence in key<br />

management <strong>and</strong> technical positions. . . . Work tasks were inadequately<br />

defined <strong>and</strong> scheduled . . . <strong>and</strong>, largely as a result of these<br />

conditions, budget <strong>and</strong> control were deficient.<br />

115

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