Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967 - NASA's History Office

July 31 ASTRONAUTICS AND AERONAUTICS, 1967
oriented and distracted him and denied him normal height information;
(2) The large amplitude roll oscillation during final approach . . .
caused a temporary loss of lateral control . . . and changed the landing
heading”; (3) presence of rescue helicopter mar path of landing heading
represented a collision potential; (4) lack of visual height cues in
landing area; and (5) unavoiddble absence of radioed attitude callouts
from chase aircraft. Board recommended: (1) easing pilot workloads
in landing lifting-body vehicles ; (2) maintaining an enlarged cleared
area where inadvertent landings might ocour; and (3) improving the
information flow on flight planning, briefing, and monitoring procedures.
(FRC Release 20-67; NASA Release 67-205)
NASA would negotiate with Bendix Corp. for one-year, $25-million contract
extension to provide KSC launch support services. (NASA Release 67-204)
* A Polaris A-3 missile fired from nuclear submarine U.S.S. Will Rogers,
submerged off the coast of Cape Kennedy, traveled 1,500 mi down
Eastern Test Range (ETR) and impacted close to target area near
Antigua Island. Scheduled to begin her first patrol in September, U.S.S.
Will Rogers was 4lst and last ballistic weapon submarine in U.S. fleet.
(Baldwin, NYT, 8/1/67,13)
William C. Schneider, formerly Mission Director for NASA’s Apollo Applications
(AA) program, was named Apollo Mission Director and Apollo
Program Deputy Director for Missions, OMSF. Schneider would be
responsible for management, direction, and coordination of mission and
flight plans, schedules, and associated activities. (NASA Release 67-206)
During July: Editorial comment on proposed NASA FY 1968 authorization
bills [see June 281 :
Science: “The political atmosphere surrounding the US. space program
is today murkier and less hospitable than at any time since 1961
when President Kennedy-decided to send men to the moon. This does
not necessarily mean that NASA is in any danger of falling off its $5billion-a-year
budgetary plateau . . . [but] it is clear that, where
Congress is concerned, the agency has lost much of its innocence and
therefore its plans are to be reviewed with caution and skepticism.
“Some members of Congress are remarkably frank in indicating that
their principal interest in the space program lies in the economic benefits
it brings their districts. . . . Indeed, one might be justified in
predicting that the major budgetary struggles of the future will be less
concerned with how much money NASA gets than with how NASA spends
the money it does get.” (Carter, Science, 7/14/67, 170-3)
Washington Evening Star: “If continuity and momentum are to be
maintained in the space program . . . the [congressional] conferees
must act with special wisdom this year.
“TWO . . . items in the House bill should be embodied in one final
version. . . . One would establish an independent safety panel in NASA,
and the other would require . . . [NASA] to keep Congress ‘fully and
currently informed’ of problem areas in the space &ort.
“Both proposals were strongly opposed by administration spokesmen
on grounds that seem shallow and legalistic. It would be well to embody
both in the final 1968 authorization bill, if only to put NASA on firm
notice that it is time to shape up.” (W Star, 7/7/67, A16)
New York Times: “To read the record of the Congressional debate
on NASA’s budget is a melancholy experience. . . . Behind the rhetoric
it was easy to see the pressure of the many corporations and commu-
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