Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967 - NASA's History Office

ASTRONAUTICS AND AERONAUTICS, 1967
May 9
and service module and lunar module with the Saturn booster system;
selection of a third contractor to make necessary modifications to stand-
ard Apollo spacecraft produced by NAA; and consideration of offers by
other aerospace companies to provide contractor assistance in Apollo
systems management and check-out and test procedures.
Dr. Seamans described impact of Jan. 27 fire on Apollo schedule
and budget. Lunar landing before 1970 “remains possible,” he said.
“The impact . . . has been to reduce that probability, not eliminate
it. . . . After the first manned Block I1 flight on the uprated Saturn I
in 1968, we plan three to four manned Saturn V missions . . . [and] in
1969 . . . up to six Saturn V missions.” Resulting $75 million of addi-
tional costs through FY 196Cfor materials and equipment changes,
flammability testing, launch facility modifications, and spacecraft de-
livery rescheduling-would be absorbed within the total budget plan
currently before Congress.
NASA’s responses to recommendations by Apollo 2044 Review Board
were outlined by Dr. Mueller: (1) bulk combustibles and other flam-
mable materials had been replaced with flame-resistant materials, and
necessary flammables stored in fireproof containers; (2) emergency
procedures would be reviewed and exercised prior to each hazardous
operation, and a quick-opening hatch installed for simplified egress
from capsule; (3) new NASA Office of Flight Safety would be established
under OMSF to review and evaluate safety provisions and monitor test
operations; (4) all emergency equipment had been reviewed and addi-
tions or substitutions-including installation of water fire extinguish-
ers-made where necessary; (5) detailed design review of spacecraft
communications system had been conducted and minor changes made
to assure reliable operation; (6) full-scale mockup tests had been con-
ducted to assess fire hazard and problems of gas detection and control;
and (7) management and organizational changes had been instituted
to clarify responsibilities and improve coordination between NASA
centers and contractors.
In response to questions by Sen. Margaret C. Smith (R-Me.) re-
garding rating of companies in the 1%1 Apollo spacecraft contract
competition, Webb said that Martin Co. had been rated first, on the
basis of its technical proposal, by the source evaluation board. However
he, Dr. Dryden, and Dr. Seamanwonsidering other factors such as
lower cost estimate, outstanding company performance record, overall
capability offered, and experience with X-15 experimental aircraft-
chose NAA as prime candidate.
Senator Smith expressed concern that the Committee was not kept
informed of serious problems revealed in the Phillips Report and asked
whether NASA followed any guidelines to determine when situations
should be brought to the attention of the Committee. Webb replied that
no such guidelines existed and indicated that he thought it unnecessary
to detail the problems to the Committee since he thought that NASA
could control them. Several other committee members also expressed
their desire to be informed of any problems approaching the magnitude
of those surrounding the Phillips Report. When Sen. Walter F. Mondale
(D-Minn.) continued to criticize NASA’s reluctance to make the report
public, Webb offered to discuss it, in complete context, in executive
session, and repeated his objection to releasing such evaluations of
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