Astronautics and Aeronautics, 1967 - NASA's History Office

ASTRONAUTICS AND AERONAUTICS, 1967 During February
Business Week: “After 16 space flights, in which 19 astronauts re.
turned from their missions safely, many had forgotten the inescapable
peril of exploration. No previous frontier has ever been crossed without
the loss of life; it was not to be expected that spacsthe most perilous
frontier of them all-could be conquered without sacrifice. None of this
lessens the grief that every man in NASA feels for fallen comrades. But
it is the nature of test pilots . . . to accept disaster not as defeat but
as a call for intensified effort and dedication.” (Bus Wk, 2/4/67)
Washington Evening Star: “Now that the initial shock . . . is be-
ginning to wear off, the second guessers are . . . wondering whether we
should be going to the moon at all. . . . From any rational point of view,
the only thing to do is to carry on. The Apollo program necessarily will
mark time until the true cause of the spacecraft disaster is located and
corrected. It is conceivable that the delay could cause the Dec. 31,1969,
deadline to be missed. It is entirely possible that the Russians may get
to the moon ahead of us. But so what? The world will not end nor the
United States vanish, if the Russians beat us to the moon. . . . It would
be senseless to stop now. Fortunately, it probably would also be im-
possible.” (Hines, W Star, 2/2/67)
Editor & Publisher: “The recent disaster at Cape Kennedy indi-
cates we are no less reluctant to face up to disaster than anyone else.
Not only were our reporters not prepared for it-none of them were
there for the simulated flight test-but neither were our space of-
ficials . . . [because] the full import of the tragedy was fed out piece-
meal. . . . The lessons for NASA officials and for newsmen are obvious.
Space travel is fraught with dangers in every test, every maneuver, every
piece of equipment, but we became complacent about them because of
our successes. NASA’s record of dealing with the press up to now has
been pretty good and if it hasn’t already developed a ‘disaster plan’ for
such accidents it soon will. News media have learned that nothing in the
space program should be considered ‘routine’ and that front row seat
should never be left unoccupied at any time.” (Editor & Publisher,
2/11/67)
Some press reaction to the accident later became increasingly critical
Of NASA:
Washington Evening Star: “The implication of the NASA story was
that no fire extinguishing apparatus or quick escape mechanismneither
of which was present on the Apollo l-could have saved the
men. The implication of the truth is that if the spacecraft had been
equipped with a means of blowing open the hatch, Grissom, White and
Chaffee might have had a chance. NASA’s motive in attempting to distort
the truth may have been to protect the families of the astronauts from
undue mental anguish. But it also served the function of protecting NASA
by heading off criticism of the agency . . . by deliberately misleading
the press, Congress and the public.” (W Star, 2/9/67)
New York Times: ‘The most basic issue . . . is not, as NASA has
tended to emphasize, the source of the spark that started the fire. It is
rather the question of why so much was permitted to hinge on the assump-
tion that there would be no fire. . . .
“The answer is only secondarily, as a NASA official has suggested, that
‘alertness . . . had become dulled’ by previous successes. . . . More
fundamental was the willingness to gamble for the sake of winning the
race to the moon.” (NYT, 2/28/67,%)
57