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over which they have control than do the residents, who basically control just their own domestic<br />

use. This has significant policy implications because as properties are converted to <strong>submetering</strong><br />

<strong>and</strong> RUBS <strong>billing</strong> <strong>program</strong>s, owners no longer receive an effective price signal from the utility<br />

bill. This implies that the impetus to reduce dem<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> conserve water on the part of managers<br />

<strong>and</strong> owners is all but lost once a <strong>billing</strong> <strong>program</strong> is implemented. While the impact of water<br />

pricing is then passed on to the residents, it is apparent that they are much less sensitive to price<br />

than are the owners. Because many residents rent their dwelling units, they are unlikely to invest<br />

in water conserving fixtures such as toilets, clothes washers, showerheads, faucets <strong>and</strong> leak<br />

repair. In many cases residents may not be permitted to install new fixtures. Leak repair<br />

remains the responsibility of the property manager <strong>and</strong> should be performed as a routine matter.<br />

Interior Retrofits <strong>and</strong> Billing Programs<br />

These results suggest that if utilities are interested in accelerating the installation of water<br />

conserving fixtures <strong>and</strong> appliances in their service area, it may be necessary to m<strong>and</strong>ate these<br />

installations as a condition of conversion to a water <strong>and</strong> wastewater <strong>billing</strong> <strong>program</strong>. Once a<br />

water <strong>and</strong> wastewater <strong>billing</strong> <strong>program</strong> is implemented, most incentives to make these changes<br />

will be lost (except in common areas) <strong>and</strong> it is unlikely that residents will make these changes to<br />

their own units. Incentive based <strong>program</strong>s have spurred fixture change out <strong>and</strong> utilities may wish<br />

to encourage installation of water efficient fixtures in conjunction with their approval of water<br />

<strong>billing</strong> <strong>program</strong> in their service area.<br />

Summary of Elasticities <strong>and</strong> Comparisons with Other Studies<br />

As noted earlier, the price elasticity values found in this study are quite comparable to<br />

values found in other research conducted over the past 35 years. A comparison of the results<br />

from this study <strong>and</strong> other elasticity studies is shown in Table 6.8. This table is truncated from<br />

Table 2.1 in Chapter 2 <strong>and</strong> contains only the elasticities that offered a reasonable comparison<br />

(i.e. indoor use, non-drought pricing). The elasticities found in this study fit squarely with<br />

results from other research starting with the classic Howe <strong>and</strong> Linaweaver work from 1967 that<br />

found a residential indoor use elasticity of –0.231. The 1999 Goodman study that extrapolated<br />

multi-<strong>family</strong> elasticity from single-<strong>family</strong> dem<strong>and</strong> reported an elasticity value of –0.7. This is<br />

substantially higher than the –0.27 elasticity found in this study. Goodman’s elasticity is near<br />

the top end range of all the elasticities shown in Table 6.8. Selecting an elasticity value for a rate<br />

204

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