isaac-deutscher-the-prophet-armed-trotsky-1879-1921

THE PROPHET ARMED
events as 'symptoms pointing to the possibility of a general
armistice and universal peace'. 1
That he should have drawn such far-fetched conclusions from
what were, after all, details of the diplomatic game, must be
explained by a basic mistake in his reading of the strategic
prospects. Early in the war, when governments and general
staffs were taking an early conclusion of hostilities for granted,
he had rightly forecast the protracted stalemate of trench warfare.
2 He had been inclined to believe that neither camp could
break the stalemate resulting from the equilibrium of opposed
forces. The events of more than three years had so strikingly
confirmed this forecast that he clung to it even now, when the
premiss for it was about to vanish. The L' nited States had entered
the war. But this did not cause Trotsky to modify his view; and
after the revolution, as before, he reiterated that neither of the
hostile camps could hope to win. From this rigid assumption it
seemed logical to conclude that at length the belligerent governments
might realize the futility offurther fighting, acknowledge
the deadlock, and agree to open peace negotiations. This was
the reasoning which made him jump to a conclusion about the
possibility of an imminent 'general armistice and universal peace'.
At the same time, however, the Bolsheviks feared that the
Entente might conclude a separate peace with Germany and
Austria and strike jointly at the Russian Revolution. More than
anybody, Lenin voiced this apprehension in public and private.
The inner story of the war, when it was revealed, showed that
this was not quite groundlc~s. Germany and Austria had repeatedly
and secretly, jointly and separately put out peace
feelers to their enemies in the West.3 In the ruling classes of
France and Britain the fear of revolution was mounting; and
the possibility of an accommodation between the Entente and
the central powers, an accommodation prompted by that fear,
could not be ruled out in advance. This was a potential threat
only; but it was enough to drive Lenin to the conclusion that
only separate peace in the East could forestall separate peace
in the \Vest.
1
Trotsky, Sochinm;·a, vol. iii, book 2, pp. 210-1 I.
2
Sec Chapter viii, p. 229.
' D. Lloyd George, War lvlemoirs, vol. ii, chapter lxx; Richard von Kuhlmann,
Erinnerungm, pp .• 1-75-87.