isaac-deutscher-the-prophet-armed-trotsky-1879-1921

THE DRAMA OF BREST LITOVSK 375
and play for time, especially as Trotsky was doing his best to
impress the Left Communists with the unreality of revolutionary
war. On Lenin's proposal, against Zinoviev's solitary vote, the
Central Committee authorized Trotsky to delay by every possible
means the signature of the peace. Trotsky then submitted
his own resolution: 'We interrupt the war and do not sign the
peace-we demobilize the army.' Nine members voted for this,
seven against. Thus the party formally authorized Trotsky to
pursue his policy at Brest. 1
During this interval Trotsky also presented his report to the
third Congress of Soviets. The mood of the Congress was so
overwhelmingly in favour of war that Lenin kept in the background.
Even Trotsky spoke more emphatically about his
opposition to peace than about his opposition to war. 'The great
·speech of the evening', writes a British eye-witness, 'was made
by Trotsky, whose report ... was listened to with rapt attention.
All eyes were upon him, for he was at the zenith of his influence
... the man who incorporated the revolutionary will of Russia,
speaking to the outer world .... When Trotsky had ended his
great speech, the immense assembly of Russian workmen,
soldiers and peasants rose and ... solemnly sang the Internationale.
The outburst [was] as spontaneous as it was soul-stirring
to those who, like the writer, witnessed it ... .' 2 The Congress
unanimously approved Trotsky's report, but it took no decision
and left the government a free hand.
Before Trotsky set out on his return journey to Brest, he made
a private arrangement with Lenin which, in one point, modified
essentially the decisions of the Central Committee and of the
government. He promised that in certain circumstances he would
abandon his own policy in favour of Lenin's. His tactics made
sense as long as the Germans were willing to allow him to evade
the choice between war and peace. What would happen, Lenin
anxiously asked, if they chose to resume hostilities? Lenin was
rightly convinced that this was bound to happen. Trotsky
treated this danger lightly, but he agreed to sign the peace if
Lenin's fears proved justified. That he and Lenin should have
found it permissible so to depart from the formal decision of the
Central Committee and of the government was due to the
1 Prow/roly Tun. Kam., pp. 199-207.
• M. Philips Price, .My Reminiscmces of the Russian Reuolution, pp. 224-5.