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isaac-deutscher-the-prophet-armed-trotsky-1879-1921

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REVOLUTION AND CONQ.UEST 463<br />

policy: its line was firmly set; it was 'absolutely clear' that<br />

England helped and would continue to help both <strong>the</strong> Poles and<br />

Wrangel. 1<br />

In July, after Lord Curzon's offer of mediation, <strong>the</strong> issue<br />

was once again under discussion. Lenin communicated <strong>the</strong><br />

offer to Trotsky, who was at <strong>the</strong> front. On <strong>the</strong> same day,<br />

13July, Trotsky replied in two messages, urging <strong>the</strong> Politbureau<br />

and Chicherin to accept British mediation between Russia and<br />

Poland, and to aim at an armistice which would lead to peace<br />

with <strong>the</strong> Entente as well as with Poland.2 He once again advised<br />

<strong>the</strong> Politbureau to pay more careful attention to divergent<br />

trends in British opinion and policy.3<br />

The Politbureau rejected Trotsky's proposals and, of course,<br />

<strong>the</strong> British offer. Oddly enough, it asked Trotsky to administer<br />

<strong>the</strong> rebuff to Lord Curzon. Actuated by <strong>the</strong> principle of<br />

Cabinet solidarity, he did so. In a scintillating sarcastic manifesto,<br />

from which nobody could even remotely guess his mental<br />

reservations, he explained that <strong>the</strong> British government, with its<br />

record of intervention, was a party to <strong>the</strong> conflict and could not<br />

aspire to render service as an impartial conciliator. 4<br />

This difference, after all, concerned only diplomatic tactics.<br />

But it was connected with ano<strong>the</strong>r and fundamental controversy.<br />

Rejecting Curzon's proposal, Lenin demanded 'a furious speeding<br />

up of <strong>the</strong> offensive on Poland'. To this, too, Trotsky was<br />

opposed. By now <strong>the</strong> Red Army had reconquered all Ckrainian<br />

and Byclorussian lands and stood roughly along a line which<br />

Lord Curzon, when he still reckoned with Denikin's victory,<br />

had proposed as <strong>the</strong> frontier between Russia and Poland. At<br />

this line Trotsky intended to halt <strong>the</strong> Red Army and to make<br />

a public offer of peace. Lenin and <strong>the</strong> majority of <strong>the</strong> Politbureau<br />

were bent on continuing <strong>the</strong> pursuit of <strong>the</strong> Poles into<br />

Warsaw and beyond.<br />

Once again <strong>the</strong> interplay of politics and strategy dominated<br />

<strong>the</strong> dispute. There was a military risk in Trotsky's proposal.<br />

1<br />

A resolution of <strong>the</strong> Politbureau, also dated 4June, shows that <strong>the</strong> Politbureau<br />

bdieved that Pilsudski acted in collusion with <strong>the</strong> German government a' well.<br />

• Trotsky was. however, against any mediation in <strong>the</strong> conflict between <strong>the</strong> Soviets<br />

and Wrang

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