isaac-deutscher-the-prophet-armed-trotsky-1879-1921

THE DRAMA OF BREST LITOVSK 395
debate. In a most incisive speech Lenin urged ratification of the
peace. The main burden of his argument was against the war
faction, but he also castigated Trotsky's 'great mistake' and
wishful belief that ~he Germans would not attack, the belief
which had underlain 'neither war nor peace'.' The war faction
jumped to Trotsky's defence. 'Even the chauvinist German
press', Radek said, 'had to admit that the proletariat of Germany
was against Hindenburg and for Trotsky. Our policy at
Brest Litovsk has not failed; it has not been an illusion but a
policy of revolutionary realism." It was much better for the
Soviets to have concluded peace only after the German offensive,
because nobody could doubt that they acted under external
compulsion. But then Radek voiced the war faction's
disappointment with Trotsky: 'One may reproach Trotsky only
for this, that having achieved so much at Brest he then joined
the other side .... For this we have a right to reproach him; and
we do so.' 3
Trotsky once again, and more explicitly, justified his behaviour.
Bukharin, Radek, and their friends, he said, saw in
war the only salvation and so they were 'obliged, infringing
upon formal party considerations, to pose the issue on a knifeedge
.... With a weak country behind us, with a passive
peasantry, with a sombre mood in the proletariat, we were
further threatened by a split in our own ranks .... Very much
was at stake on my vote .... I could not assume responsibility
for the split. I had thought that we ought to retreat L before the
German army] rather than sign peace for the sake of an illusory
respite. But I could not take upon myself the responsibility for
the leadership of the party .... 4
This, as far as the records show, was the only time he openly
stated that he had shrunk from superseding Lenin as the leader
of the party. 'The danger of the split', he added, 'will have
neither disappeared nor lessened if European revolution is further
delayed.' 5 He admitted that he had misjudged German
intentions, but he reminded Lenin that they had both agreed on
breaking off the negotiations. He had, he said, a profound respect
for Lenin's policy, but not for the manner in which Lenin's
faction was putting its case before the country. They fostered
apathy and defeatism, which were demoralizing the working
I Ibid., p. 22. ' Ibid., p. 71. ) Ibid., p. 72. • Ibid., p. 83. I Ibid., p. 84.