BRITISH IDENTITY AND THE GERMAN OTHER A Dissertation ...

importance should be weighed carefully in assessing the British position. Germany’s remarkable
political and economic metamorphosis into a fledgling world power and formidable competitor
would not in itself explain the diplomatic antagonism were it not for Germany’s geographical
proximity to England—the economic expansion of the United States was equally dramatic. 45 Nor
would the ideological gulf separating “liberal” England from “reactionary” Prussian-dominated
Germany have necessarily precluded an entente, like the ones signed with Japan in 1902 or
Russia in 1907. The mutual distrust and suspicion in diplomatic and government circles that
hampered attempts at constructive negotiation rested on the diametrically opposed global
strategies of the two nations: England committed to preserving empire by maintaining the
European status quo and Germany bent on expanding empire by changing it. Refusal to
compromise by either government fueled the antagonism. 46 The ill-conceived German policy of
winning British cooperation through humiliation only played into the hands of Germanophobes
in the British press and Foreign Office who advocated a tougher policy toward Germany.
In the search for causes of World War I historians have pointed out the lack of
coordination and direction in Wilhelminian Germany’s foreign policy, and its effect at the British
Foreign Office, as a destabilizing factor. 47 In addition to German diplomatic risk-taking during
the twenty-five years prior to world War I, Britain’s failure to make a clear declaration of support
for Belgian inviolability has come under fire. 48 Britain’s unwillingness to abandon the policy of
45 Kennedy, Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 464-65.
46 Ibid., 470.
47 Craig, Germany, 244-45.
48 Joachim Remak, “1914—The Third Balkan War: Origins Reconsidered,” Journal of
Modern History 43 (September 1971): 361.
236