Experimental investigation of the spirit manifestations, [electronic ...

28 INTRODUCTION.three clcracnts above mentioned,—an unknown source of projectileforce,vis iuertioe, by which that force is perpetuated, and gravitation, by whichit is modified into elliptical, orbitual revolution, operating as laws governingplanetary movement,—it does not make the astronomer who adoptsthis conception less of a theologian; it only makes him a more enlightenedtheologian. We ascribe less to the special interference of the Creatorin proportion as our knowledge enables us to perceive results attained bygeneral laws. This, Comt6 conceives, causes theists to be less theological,and to lessen what he seems to view as the domain which theology isallowed to have. 33ut is it not more correct to assume that it is only thedomain of ignorance which grows less, while that of theology becomessimpler and more correct, but not less extensive ? It is not that less isascribed to God, but that the aggregate is more intelligently ascribed asthe laws through which his agency isrecognised are fewer.7G. Newton assumed inertia, gravitation, and motion as the foundationof his philosophy; but attributed these fundamental properties, or states ofmatter, to the will of that governing mind of which he held the existenceto be as evident as that of the matter governed.Comte does not considerthat there is any positive proof of the existence of such a ruling mind, anddoes not, therefore, find it necessary to admit the existence of a Deity.Thus, the states or properties above mentioned are, with Newton, proximate,with Comte, ultimate, causes.Hence, when we arrive at the foundationof the Newtonian doctrine, we cannot go deeper without admittingthe existence of a God. Without this admission, we involve ourselves inthe irremediable darkness of atheism.77. In this respect, I have always been a follower of Newton. Evidently,both the governing reason and the creation which it rules musthave existed from eternity; since, if nothing ever existed exclusively, itmust have forever endured, and there never could have been any thing.So, if there ever had been no mind, there never could have been anymind.78. The human mind, says Comte, by its nature employs, in its progress,three methods of philosophizing,—the theological, the metaphysical,and the positive, diff'ering essentially from each other, and even radicallyopposed. Hence, he assumes the successive existence of three modes ofcontemplating the aggregate phenomena of the universe, any one of whichexcludes the others. The first, "is the point of departure of the humanunderstanding ; the third, its idtimate, fixed, definite state; the second,merely a state of transition from the first tothe thirdJ*79. It seems to be assumed that the intellectual progress of the humanmind must necessarily be through these three stages. Moreover, it issuggested that each individual, in reviewing the progression of his mindfrom childhood to mature age, will perceive that he was a theologian inhis childhood, a metaphysician in his youth, and a natural philosopher in