MAGICAL MEDICINE: HOW TO MAKE AN ILLNESS ... - Invest in ME
MAGICAL MEDICINE: HOW TO MAKE AN ILLNESS ... - Invest in ME
MAGICAL MEDICINE: HOW TO MAKE AN ILLNESS ... - Invest in ME
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APPENDIX VI: The Wessely’ School’s autopoietic theory of their “CBT model”.<br />
In 2007, two of the PACE Trial Pr<strong>in</strong>cipal <strong>Invest</strong>igators, Professors Trudie Chalder and Michael Sharpe,<br />
together with mental nurse V<strong>in</strong>cent Deary (described <strong>in</strong> the PACE Trial literature as a “First wave therapist<br />
(CBT)” and as a contributor to the treatment design), published a paper entitled “The cognitive behavioural<br />
model of medically unexpla<strong>in</strong>ed symptoms: A theoretical and empirical review” (Cl<strong>in</strong>ical Psychology<br />
Review 2007:27:7:781‐797) <strong>in</strong> which they expla<strong>in</strong> the rationale for their “CBT model” of CFS.<br />
These authors conducted a literature search of Medl<strong>in</strong>e and Psych<strong>in</strong>fo from 1966 to 2007 us<strong>in</strong>g MUS<br />
(medically unexpla<strong>in</strong>ed symptoms) “and related terms”. They reviewed “all relevant articles” and their search<br />
was then limited <strong>in</strong> stages by CBT, condition, treatment and type of trial. They say they found evidence for<br />
“genetic, neurological, psychophysiological, immunological, personality, attentional, attributional, affective,<br />
behavioural, social and <strong>in</strong>ter‐personal factors <strong>in</strong> the onset and ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of MUS”.<br />
From this, they deduce that MUS are the result of “<strong>in</strong>dividual factors and their autopoietic <strong>in</strong>teraction (as<br />
hypothesised by the CBT model” (surely “<strong>in</strong>dividual factors” is broad enough to mean that virtually anyth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
can cause MUS?).<br />
However, these authors mostly disregard the genetic, neurological and immunological factors and<br />
concentrate on the psychosocial factors as constituents of their “CBT model”.<br />
The authors say: “The evidence for the contribution of <strong>in</strong>dividual factors, and their autopoietic <strong>in</strong>teraction <strong>in</strong> MUS<br />
(as hypothesised by the cognitive behavioural model) is exam<strong>in</strong>ed. The evidence from the treatment trial of CBT for<br />
MUS, CFS and IBS is reviewed from an experimental test of the cognitive behavioural models”.<br />
The “CBT model” cannot, however, be tested experimentally; all that can be said is that CBT may be a useful<br />
<strong>in</strong>tervention <strong>in</strong> some subjects <strong>in</strong> some disorders, but this does not provide evidence for a “CBT model” of<br />
CFS or IBS.<br />
However, the authors state: “We conclude that a broadly conceptualised cognitive behavioural model of MUS<br />
suggests a novel and plausible mechanism of symptoms generation and has heuristic value”.<br />
Deary has previously written about heuristic value. What he seems to be say<strong>in</strong>g is that if one approaches<br />
the treatment of a patient heuristically – literally, by trial and error – one may f<strong>in</strong>d practical ways to help the<br />
patient.<br />
Such an approach ignores causality – for example, giv<strong>in</strong>g a patient laudanum t<strong>in</strong>cture will make them feel<br />
better by lessen<strong>in</strong>g their pa<strong>in</strong> but it does not tell one anyth<strong>in</strong>g about the cause of their pa<strong>in</strong>. If, whenever<br />
one reads the “CBT model” one replaces it with the “laudanum t<strong>in</strong>cture model” one will get the same result,<br />
<strong>in</strong>dicat<strong>in</strong>g that CBT does not take the cause of the disease <strong>in</strong>to account.<br />
The authors then state: “ ‘The term medically unexpla<strong>in</strong>ed symptoms names a predicament, not a specific disorder’<br />
wrote Kirmayer, Groleau, Looper and Dao (2004)”. Although Deary, Chalder and Sharpe rely on it, this is<br />
logically wrong. Medically unexpla<strong>in</strong>ed symptoms <strong>in</strong> an <strong>in</strong>dividual may <strong>in</strong> fact refer to a specific disorder –<br />
until an explanation is found, it is unknown what type of disorder is be<strong>in</strong>g described. It is also the case that<br />
s<strong>in</strong>ce MUS conta<strong>in</strong>s whatever rema<strong>in</strong>s from medically expla<strong>in</strong>ed <strong>in</strong>vestigation, it is most unlikely to be one<br />
disorder. Furthermore, it is <strong>in</strong>correct to describe MUS as a “predicament”. For example, before the<br />
pathoaetiology of Park<strong>in</strong>son’s Disease (PD) was established, us<strong>in</strong>g the authors’ model PD would have been<br />
considered a MUS, and therefore, by their reason<strong>in</strong>g, a “predicament”. Would they refer to PD as a<br />
“predicament” today? This assumes that any symptom that has not yet been expla<strong>in</strong>ed by contemporary<br />
biomedical knowledge will always be “medically unexpla<strong>in</strong>ed”, which is clearly untrue (but the Wessely<br />
School are strongly opposed to seek<strong>in</strong>g biomedical evidence for what they <strong>in</strong>sist are “medically<br />
unexpla<strong>in</strong>ed” ‐‐ and therefore psychosomatic ‐‐ symptoms: see above).