LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Hoffman and Crowther
borhoods, clearing the area of extremist elements, holding cleared areas securely,
and building up essential services and infrastructure. Yet OTF II placed
a far greater emphasis on the pace of clearing operations, rather than holding
and rebuilding cleared neighborhoods.” 64 As part of OTF II, the U.S. military
extended tours for a Stryker Brigade from Alaska by 4 months at the request
of Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, USA, the Multi-National Corps–Iraq
(MNC-I) commander. This politically charged last-minute extension, which
cut against the grain of General Casey’s desire to draw down U.S. forces in
Iraq, demonstrated the pace of the rapidly deteriorating security situation in
Baghdad.
Even with the incapacity of the coalition to stem the violence, the U.S.
military and diplomats in Iraq remained positive. On August 26, the Effects
Assessment and Synchronization Board Composite Assessment was that “we
are on track to achieve some but not all elements of Joint Campaign Plan Phase
I by early 2007, that the campaign plan remains valid, even as conflict has
grown more complex.” 65
In the end, however, insufficient forces were on hand to secure Baghdad,
and many Iraqi security force units and leaders proved to be either undependable
or excessively sectarian. The results were “disheartening,” and violence
“jumped more than 43 percent between the summer and October 2006.” 66 On
October 19, Major General William Caldwell, USA, the MNF-I spokesman,
admitted that the campaign in Baghdad had “not met our overall expectations.”
67 By the beginning of November 2006, OTF II was considered a failure
and was abandoned. 68 Regardless, OTF II did demonstrate attributes that
would contribute to the eventual success of the Surge the next year—concentration
on security in Baghdad, flooding the zone with forces to protect the
population, and using “clear” tactics as a prelude to holding and rebuilding
neighborhoods.
By September 2006, old doubts in Washington were compounded by the
failure of both the political and military plans for Iraq. The disquiet over the
situation overcame bureaucratic inertia and personal agendas, so the “real
strategic review” started at the end of the month. This review was quiet, reflecting
the desire of the Bush administration to avoid a public discussion in
the run-up to the midterm elections in November. Few even in the NSC knew
about it. This process would discover that “distressingly few assumptions”
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