LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

The Surges in Iraq and Afghanistan
10
John E. Mueller, “The Search for the ‘Breaking Point’ in Vietnam,” International Studies
Quarterly 24, no. 4 (December 1980), 497–519; Gregory A. Daddis, “The Problem of
Metrics: Assessing Progress and Effectiveness in the Vietnam War,” War in History 19, no.
1 (January 2012), 73–98.
11
Gregory A. Daddis, No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in
the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 234.
12
Graham Cosmas, MACV: The Joint Command in the Years of Escalation, 1962–1967
(Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2006), 295.
13
For challenges in assessment of counterinsurgencies, see Anthony Cordesman, The
Uncertain “Metrics” of Afghanistan (and Iraq) (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic
and International Studies, May 2007); James Clancy and Chuck Crossett, “Measuring
Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare,” Parameters 37, no. 2 (Summer 2007), 88–100; Jonathan
Schroden, “Measures for Security in a Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32,
no. 5 (October 2009), 715–744; Jonathan Schroden, “Why Operations Assessments Fail:
It’s Not Just the Metrics,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 4 (Autumn 2011).
14
Interview with Major General James N. Mattis, in Al-Anbar Awakening Vol. I: American
Perspectives: U.S. Marines and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 2004–2009, ed. Timothy S.
McWilliams and Kurtis P. Wheeler (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2009),
38.
15
Ben Connable, Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics in Counterinsurgency
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2012), xxi.
16
Jason Campbell, Michael E. O’Hanlon, and Jacob Shapiro, “How to Measure the War,”
Policy Review, no. 157 (October/November 2009), 15–30.
17
Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War
(New York: Free Press, 1996).
18
Ibid., 222.
19
Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman, “The Effectiveness of
Military Organizations,” in Military Effectiveness, The First World War, Vol. 1, ed. Allan R.
Millett and Williamson Murray (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988), 1–30.
20
Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, “Lessons of War,” The National Interest, Winter
1988/1989.
21
Williamson Murray, Military Adaptation: With Fear of Change (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), 29–35. Murray notes that it is crucial to examine the problems
associated with adaptation at the strategic level because that is where “statesmen and military
leaders have found the greatest difficulties,” and where the costs for adaptation often
represent too high a price.
22
Christopher J. Lamb et al., Human Terrain Teams: An Organizational Innovation for
Sociocultural Knowledge in Irregular Warfare (Washington, DC: Institute for World Politics
Press, 2013); and Christopher J. Lamb, Matthew Schmidt, and Berit G. Fitzsimmons,
149