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Hooker and Collins 14 James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, The Iraq Study Group Report (New York: Random House, 2006), xiii. 15 George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown, 2010), 372. 16 “In retrospect, I believe that I should have directly offered the President a broader range of options for achieving our objectives in Iraq. I had discussed different options for improving the security situation with the Secretary of Defense and Chairman. . . . In the end, I only presented the President the course of action we selected—accelerated transition— and I believe that I should have offered him a wider range of options to meet his policy needs.” George W. Casey, Jr., Strategic Reflections (Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2012), 144. 17 In addition to weekly meetings of the National Security Council on Iraq, President George W. Bush also received, and read, daily updates produced by the NSC Office for Iraq and Afghanistan. 18 Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary of War (New York: Knopf, 2014), 346. 19 The President eventually ordered a troop surge of 30,000 as recommended by Secretary Gates, announcing his decision at West Point on December 1, 2009. See Bob Woodward, “McChrystal: ‘More Forces or Mission Failure,’” Washington Post, September 21, 2009. 20 “During September several events fractured what little trust remained between the senior military and the president and his staff.” Gates, 367. 21 See Woodward, “McChrystal.” 22 Gates, 368. The chapter dealing with these events is titled “Afghanistan: A House Divided.” 23 Douglas E. Lute, interview by Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. Collins, March 10, 2015. General Petraeus also described in some detail the chain of events that led to these misunderstandings. Petraeus, interview. 24 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 372–373. 25 Lute, interview. 26 Ibid. “For the United States, fighting a sustained conflict for less than vital national interests is a waning proposition.” 27 The authors are indebted to Professor Richard Betts for these insights. 28 “Without strategy, there is no rationale for how force will achieve purposes worth the price in blood and treasure.” Richard Betts, cited in H.R. McMaster, “The Uncertainties of Strategy,” Survival (February–March 2015), 201. 29 Martin E. Dempsey, interview by Richard D. Hooker, Jr., and Joseph J. Collins, January 7, 2015. 30 Four-star theater commanders in Afghanistan averaged 12.8 months in command, compared to 17.2 months in Iraq and 30.8 months in Vietnam. 418
Reflections on Lessons Encountered 31 A remarkable number of senior officers who played key roles in the Long War were selected for advanced civil schooling at top graduate schools early in their careers. This opportunity yielded rich dividends in their strategic development. They include Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN (Ret.); General Petraeus; General Peter W. Chiarelli, USA (Ret.); General Raymond T. Odierno, USA; General Dempsey; General Abizaid; and General John R. Allen, USMC (Ret.). Former Secretary of State and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell might also be included. Other officers, most notably General James N. Mattis, USMC (Ret.), enjoy reputations as lifelong learners and self-taught strategists of the first rank. 32 Lloyd J. Austin III, interview by Richard D. Hooker, Jr., April 7, 2015. 33 Winston Churchill, My Early Life: A Roving Commission (New York: Scribner’s, 1930, rpt. 1958), 232. 419
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Human nature will not change. In an
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Source: United Nations
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Acknowledgments Military History In
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Acknowledgments J. Church, Joanna E
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Page 469: Afghanistan Timeline 2014 July Elec
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Page 483 and 484: Contributors Dr. Richard D. Hooker,
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Contributors homeland defense. His
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Contributors 2025. He was also a ch
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Contributors a JD. His publications
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