LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Lamb with Franco
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See Rice’s discussion of the personal differences between Rumsfeld and Powell (5–22).
206
For example, Franks argues tension between State and Defense arose from overlapping
missions (375), and Rice makes the same point (15–16). For another example, Rumsfeld
argues State would not relinquish the police training mission to DOD even though it did
not have the “attention, resources, and focus” to do the mission successfully. In contrast,
Secretary Clinton quotes Secretary Gates as explaining their good relationship as the
result of his “being willing to acknowledge that the Secretary of State is the principal
spokesperson for United States foreign policy” (25).
207
This is a common thesis from Department of State leaders; see Rice and Hill.
208
Rice states endemic conflict between secretaries of State and Defense is “not, as some
might think, because State is from Venus and Defense from Mars,” referring to a popular
article that explained the organizational cultural differences between those two departments.
Her evidence for the assertion was that often the “secretary of state is more willing
to use force than the Pentagon.” However, most observers do not consider willingness to
use military force a good indicator of cultural differences between State and Defense (15).
209
For example, Secretary Gates believes the wrong choice for Deputy Secretary of State
complicated unity of effort in the Obama administration (289). Many other senior leader
accounts similarly underscore the importance of choosing the right people to generated
unified effort (for example, Bush, Decision Points, 89–90; Rice, 15; Rumsfeld, 299–300,
687; McChrystal, My Share of the Task, 168).
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Gates, 92.
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Rumsfeld, 375–376.
212
DeLong, 74.
213
Clinton, 28.
214
Rice, 15.
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Dempsey, interview. General Dempsey also notes that developing trust requires understanding
a superior’s or colleague’s leadership and decisionmaking style. He notes the three
Secretaries of Defense he has worked with are significantly different in this regard. Hadley
makes a similar observation, noting the difference between Rumsfeld and Gates, both of
whom were strong secretaries but with different styles. Gates was willing to be more of a
team player, “and there was a level of trust between Gates, Condi and me.” Hadley, interview.
216
“The Bush All-Stars,” New York Times, January 22, 2001. The Times noted that from the
Republican viewpoint, “President George W. Bush has assembled a national security dream
team, featuring Dick Cheney as vice president, Colin Powell as secretary of state, Donald
Rumsfeld as secretary of defense and Condoleezza Rice as national security adviser.”
217
Tenet, 358, 364–365. See also Cheney, 404–405, 416.
218
Even General Franks, known for being straightforward, made a point of saying he
“never doubted the loyalty or the motivation” of other leaders and that he did not want to
apportion blame for any perceived misdeeds (544–545).
268