LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Lamb with Franco
themes for Operation Enduring Freedom even though they originated in DOD.
However, after a few weeks, State had second thoughts about the themes and
fought to revise them. 196 By the time the United States was preparing for Operation
Iraqi Freedom, interagency differences of opinion on communication
themes were so sharp that none could be agreed upon. The United States went
to war with each department putting out its own storyline. Similarly, as time
passed State insisted that bilateral discussions with foreign governments revert
to well-established practices managed by State.
Interagency relationships in the field were also slow to develop, fragile,
and subject to great variance. We noted that the chemistry between our teams
of Ambassadors and joint force commanders was in some cases productively
catalytic but more frequently corrosive and sometimes explosive. 197 The point
to make here is that interagency success and failure were not just a function
of personal relationships; even Ambassadors and joint force commanders intent
on working well together found it a challenge because their departments
assessed the situation differently and had different priorities and different cultures.
General Casey underscores this point. He notes Presidential guidance
emphasized that helping Iraq through the transition to democracy would take
“the full commitment of all agencies,” and that “in all activities, the Chief of
Mission and Commander, USCENTCOM shall ensure the closest cooperation
and mutual support.” 198 Nevertheless, Casey asserts the guidance:
did not create the unity of command necessary for the effective integration
of civil-military efforts in successful counterinsurgency operations.
The Ambassador and I would have to create the unity of effort required
for success. This would prove a constant struggle as the two supporting
bureaucracies—State and Defense—often had differing views. Things
would get more complex as we increasingly brought the new Iraqi government
into the effort. The political and economic effects, so necessary to
sustaining our military success, would be outside of my direct control. 199
The “often differing views” of State and Defense ensured the large array
of small interagency groups assembled in Afghanistan and Iraq struggled to
be productive. Interagency high-value target teams were hit and miss but improved
over time. The same is true of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, al-
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