LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Hoffman and Crowther
the [Joint Chiefs of Staff], the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
the Treasury, Vice President Dick Cheney’s office, and the NSC staff.” 75 The
President had authorized the Joint Staff, DOD, Department of State, and NSC
to work together for the formal review. The government needed to revisit the
entire logic of the operations in Iraq and develop a series of options. The White
House made it clear going into this process that there was no tolerance for
defeat and withdrawal. Each one of the organizations produced papers for the
review, which took place out of the public eye.
The NSC staff used its part of the review as an excuse to examine the
assumptions that it had created for the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq.
This turned out to be a sobering exercise. In the end, the NSC team lost faith
in some assumptions and actually believed the opposite of others. The various
efforts resulted in “a merged product which provided several options”: tough it
out (that is, more of the same), accelerate train and transition operations, hunker
down (get out of cities and stay on forward operating bases), or ramp up. 76
The NSC, Joint Staff, and State Department spent November discussing
the options; Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld continued to hold the line. On November
6, the New York Times reported that Rumsfeld sent a classified memorandum
to the President, reportedly articulating “above the line” options (that
could and, in several cases, should be combined with others) and “below the
line,” or less attractive, options. 77 These less attractive options included continuing
on the current path, moving a large faction of U.S forces into Baghdad
in an attempt to control it, increasing Brigade Combat Teams and U.S. forces
in Iraq substantially, and setting a firm withdrawal date. The above the line
options reportedly included declaring that with Saddam Hussein gone and
Iraq a sovereign nation, the Iraqi people could govern themselves, telling Iran
and Syria to stay out, assisting in accelerating an aggressive federalism plan,
moving toward three separate states—Sunni, Shia, and Kurd—or trying a Dayton-like
peace process. 78 So Rumsfeld’s reported above the line options were
more of the same, while he did not support other newer options.
Although President Bush desired to keep the review out of the election,
the election nevertheless had a large impact on the review. The day after the
Republicans lost control of Congress in the 2006 mid-term, President Bush
announced that he had accepted the resignation of Secretary Rumsfeld and
was nominating Robert Gates as his successor. 79 Secretary Rumsfeld, now a
106