LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

The Surges in Iraq and Afghanistan
lame duck, agreed to stay for the transition and eventually departed on December
18, 2006.
During the same period, President Bush started referring to “a new way
forward” for Iraq. Although everyone now knew that a strategic review was
under way and that there would be a new approach, the President had not yet
made up his mind on which approach to take. There was no shortage of options
covering the spectrum, from the full withdrawal that Congress wanted to
doubling down and going for a win. As several commentators have mentioned
about the Bush decisionmaking process, different staffs would work out an
entire problem and then, having reached consensus, would brief the President.
This review was different. During the Iraq relook, as appropriate, key actors
took individual issues to the President rather than reaching overall consensus
first. The President gave a key piece of guidance early in December when the
NSC asked him, “‘What is the U.S. role in population security?’ The President
stated that it was mission number one. All proposals logically flowed from this
statement.” 80
On December 6, 2006, the Iraq Study Group released its official report to
the President, Congress, and public. This report considered four options: precipitate
withdrawal, stay the course, more troops for Iraq, and devolution to
three regions. It also made 79 specific recommendations. It discussed the need
for a new external approach titled “Building an International Consensus” and
a new internal approach titled “Helping Iraqis Help Themselves.” The diplomatic
approach called for a “New Diplomatic Offensive” to put the problems
into a regional context and to deal with issues in that region. The report also
stipulated Iraqi milestones and new efforts for national reconciliation and governance.
Additionally it addressed security, calling for a new “Military Strategy
for Iraq” that required accelerated Iraqi control of security and embedding
more advisors in the security forces. 81 It also called for changes in the police
and criminal justice system, a new approach to U.S. economic and reconstruction
assistance, the use of U.S. personnel, and U.S. intelligence. 82
The report had supporters and detractors. On December 7, Foreign Affairs
hosted a roundtable to discuss it. 83 Stephen Biddle, Larry Diamond, James
Dobbins, and Leslie Gelb debated the issue. Biddle stated that the report “offers
the political groundwork for a complete withdrawal more than it offers a sustainable
solution to the conflict.” 84 Diamond stated, “The seduction of a com-
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