LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

The Surges in Iraq and Afghanistan
Iraq Outcomes
There is an ongoing discussion about whether the Surge in Iraq succeeded
and whether it was worth the effort. As a holistic approach, there are a wide
variety of both continuities and differences to examine. Peter Feaver identifies
several:
the surge of military forces, the surge of civilian forces, the prioritization
of population protection, the emphasis on the bottom-up political
accommodation that harnessed the so-called Tribal Awakening of
Sunni tribes in al-Anbar Province that had begun to fight back against
al-Qaida in Iraq’s predations, the increased special operations attacks
on al-Qaida in Iraq and on rogue Shiite militias, the greater decentralization
and diversification of efforts beyond the Green Zone. 150
Although each of these efforts has its proponents and its critics, it is impossible
to disaggregate any one part of the Surge approach. In the long run,
the Surge did not resolve Iraq’s problems. No external military force can resolve
another country’s political issues in the modern world; 151 however, external
forces in this case reduced violence dramatically, which provided an
opportunity for the Iraqis to resolve their internal political issues. The fact that
Nouri al-Maliki did not take the opportunity to unite Iraq does not diminish
the military results of the Surge. 152
The first question is to ask why President Bush took so long to make a decision.
It appears that he was reluctant to impose himself on the decisionmaking
of his senior subordinates. His own history and background as “a product
of the Vietnam era” made him uncomfortable with getting into the details of
decisions about the use of the military. 153 History suggested to him that there
was a fine line between setting strategy and micromanaging combat. He consciously
sought to avoid constraining his generals or impacting their abilities
to win the war. Furthermore, the President valued loyalty and was accused of
surrounding himself with people who placed a premium on conformity over
debate or dissent. 154
Feaver writes, “One study notes that President Bush mentioned delegating
the decision on troop levels to his ground commanders in 2006 more than
thirty times in that year alone.” 155 It took the political disaster of losing control
123