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9/11 and After: Legal Issues, Lessons, and Irregular Conflict<br />

White House, September 2002), 9, available at .<br />

The use of the term preemptive was unfortunate and seemed to mark a<br />

break with the historical U.S. position that the international law of self-defense included<br />

a right of anticipatory self-defense, as had been established by Daniel Webster in 1841<br />

and adhered to by every administration since then. The documents establishing this<br />

interpretation of international law are in the Caroline file, available at . As Professor Yoram Dinstein, formerly twice the<br />

Stockton Professor of International Law at the Naval War College, frequently argues, if the<br />

2002 National Security Strategy had used the word interceptive, it would have preempted<br />

problems. The National Security Strategy is a political, not a legal, document.<br />

38<br />

UNPA.<br />

39<br />

UN Charter Article 51, which reads:<br />

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective<br />

self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the<br />

Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.<br />

Measures taken by Members in exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately<br />

reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility<br />

of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it<br />

deems necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.<br />

On the controversies over the meaning of “armed attack,” see Yoram Dinstein, War,<br />

Aggression, and Self-Defence, 5 th ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011),<br />

196–277; Nicholas Rostow, “International Law and the Use of Force: A Plea for Realism,”<br />

Yale Journal of International Law 34, no. 2 (Summer 2009), 549.<br />

40<br />

See Dinstein, Conduct, throughout; Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano,<br />

Law and Minimum World Public Order: The Legal Regulation of International Coercion<br />

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).<br />

41<br />

U.S. courts, administrations, and the Department of Defense use the term unlawful<br />

combatant. As a matter of law, there is no such person. One either is a combatant or a<br />

noncombatant. If one is a combatant, one may, as a matter of law, engage in activities that<br />

otherwise would constitute murder. If one is a noncombatant, one may not engage in such<br />

conduct without incurring risk of prosecution. Fighter would be a more neutral term than<br />

unlawful combatant and would make the distinction clear. The Obama administration<br />

uses the term unprivileged belligerent, which approximates the same idea. See Ex Parte<br />

Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Dinstein, Conduct, 33. Rather than insist on usage that readers<br />

may find unfamiliar, we adopt the common parlance of lawful and unlawful combatants to<br />

distinguish between combatants, who enjoy the privilege of killing as a matter of international<br />

and domestic law, and noncombatants, who do not enjoy such privilege and are not<br />

entitled, as a matter of law, to prisoner of war status on capture.<br />

42<br />

The Third Geneva Convention in effect contains a roadmap for treating detainees.<br />

43<br />

George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,”<br />

385

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