LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Hoffman and Crowther
Evaluating Assessment and Adaptation
This analytical effort now turns to the evaluation phase. This is not a comparative
analysis between two administrations. 179 The strategic context and personalities
and timing of these two different cases varied in many ways. What we
hope to identify here are common themes and issues attendant to strategic assessments
and strategic adaptations. We again apply our analytical framework
of the five assessment/adaptation decision factors to guide the evaluation.
Iraq
Performance Assessment Mechanisms. Assessments were widespread on
Iraq long before the Surge decision was made in December 2006. Assessments
began almost immediately after the bombing of the mosque in Samarra on
February 22, when General Casey asked what civil war would look like and
considered convening another Baghdad-based Red Cell to take a look at the
question. 180 Khalilzad and Casey formed the Joint Strategic Planning and Assessments
cell in February 2006. 181 Casey continued to ask the right questions
throughout the summer of 2006. 182 By the fall of 2006, when it became obvious
that efforts in Iraq were failing, the National Security Council, Congress,
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff all developed their own analytic
groups to assess the situation in Iraq.
Collaborative Information-sharing Environment. The main obstacle to a
government-wide reassessment seems to have been Secretary Rumsfeld, who
refused to approve a formal effort. 183 As such, groups such as the NSC performed
private assessments. This slowed interagency communications but
did not prevent them as Interagency Working Groups, deputies’ committees,
and principals’ committee meetings all continued on their regular schedules.
Communications between Washington and Iraq were constant. The MNF-I
chronology refers to a constant series 184 of secure video teleconferences between
MNF-I and the NSC, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. Casey
also returned to Washington periodically to render reports to Congress and
the Secretary of Defense. Communications within Iraq were also robust, with
Casey meeting regularly with his senior officers as well as visiting all of his
units deployed throughout Iraq.
Strategic Coordination. The NSC had already been deeply involved in
Iraq decisionmaking before the events of 2006. In her role as National Security
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