LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Collins
The problem of Fallujah did not go away. Working closely with the new interim
government under Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, General Casey turned his
attention to the destruction of the insurgent base there. In November 2004, with
the support of the Allawi government, Marines and Army forces reattacked the
reinforced stronghold. It was one of the costliest battles of the war. Between the
two offensives in Fallujah, U.S. forces lost nearly 150 killed and 1,000 wounded.
This time, the Iraqi government stood up under the strain of a major battle. 150
In other areas, while still awaiting the new counterinsurgency doctrine,
many units—for example, the 101 st Airborne Division in Mosul in 2003, the
Marines in Anbar, the 3 rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar, and various
battalions inside fractious Baghdad—began the practice of counterinsurgency
operations, despite being short of supporting resources. From 2005 on, coalition
forces improved their operations against the insurgents and laid the security
groundwork for successful nationwide elections and the further development
of Iraqi security forces. While repetitive tours stressed the ground forces,
learning and experience counted when they returned to Iraq. Throughout
this period, the command worked closely with the Embassy and the emerging
Iraqi government. The training of police and army units improved, as did
partnering between U.S. and Iraqi units.
Nationwide, however, violence continued to grow from around 500 violent
incidents per month in July 2003 to 2,500 in January 2005, the month
of the first successful Iraqi election. In February 2006, Iraq exploded in
sectarian violence after the bombing of the Shiite al-Askari mosque (also
called the Golden Mosque) in Samarra; total security incidents grew to
over 1,400 per week in the worst periods. 151 Shiite militias went on the
warpath after the bombing, and al Qaeda exploited the alienation of the
Sunni from the Shia-dominated Iraqi government under Nouri al-Maliki.
The government could not control the fighting. Iraqi soldiers and policemen
were too few in number and inadequate in capacity to get the job
done. 152 In June 2006, al Qaeda chief Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed in
an airstrike. Unfortunately, his demise did not lessen al Qaeda–inspired
violence. By the end of 2006, more than 50 Iraqi civilians were being killed
in the fighting every day. 153
It was increasingly clear that there were insufficient troops on the ground
to clear, hold, and build, while simultaneously standing up the Iraqi security
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