LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

How System Attributes Trumped Leadership
General Casey knew that his DOD superiors and all the Service chiefs
did not support the Surge and preferred greater efforts to hand off the security
mission to Iraqi forces. Providing realistic alternatives to their preferred approach
for the President’s consideration would require ignoring his superiors’
policy preferences and could have been interpreted as jumping the chain of
command.
Alford, McMaster, MacFarland, and other successful field commanders
faced the same dilemma working under Casey. 141 Yet they realized local Iraqi
leaders could not afford to support American forces and the new government
if the forces were trying to leave and the government looked like it would collapse.
Success required convincing locals that the United States was “in it to
win it,” defined as not walking away until the government could manage its
own security. Thus, these commanders had to turn the prevailing counterinsurgency
approach on its head. As noted previously, instead of stating U.S.
forces would stand down as the Iraqis took responsibility for security, they assured
local Iraqis that if they stood up to defend themselves, U.S. forces would
stand by them until the enemy was defeated. Some general officers such as
General McChrystal also innovated well in trying circumstances. 142
Innovation needs to be recognized, rewarded, and quickly replicated. In
most cases the successes were recognized; they were so glaring they could
hardly be ignored. Lessons from successful commanders also were shared
both formally and informally (for example, Jurney learned directly from Alford,
and MacFarland from McMaster). However, the record on rewarding and
replicating these tactical successes was spotty. Some, but hardly all, successful
field commanders were promoted by their parent organizations, and sometimes
only begrudgingly.
The replication of these successful examples was even more limited. General
Casey was right to be concerned about U.S. ground forces accepting counterinsurgency
principles that ran against their organizational cultures. At best,
the U.S. military adopted proven counterinsurgency techniques slowly and
unevenly. 143 More importantly, however, tactical successes were not replicated
because the methods they relied upon challenged prevailing policy and strategy.
Tactical partnering with local forces could fuel sectarian sentiments and
undermine formal Iraqi governmental structures that the United States was
committed to supporting. It also often involved working with local leaders
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