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The Surges in Iraq and Afghanistan<br />

Iraq signed a pair of agreements that defined their bilateral relationship. This<br />

included a Status of Forces Agreement that stipulated the departure of U.S.<br />

forces from Iraq by the end of 2011.<br />

In late 2009, the last of the coalition partners departed Iraq, and U.S. forces<br />

started to reorganize for a transition to a new security arrangement. On<br />

September 1, 2009, the United States declared the end of Operation Iraqi Freedom<br />

and the beginning of Operation New Dawn. On January 1, 2010, MNF-I,<br />

MNC-I, and Multi-National Security and Training Command–Iraq combined<br />

to form U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF-I). During 2011, when it became obvious that<br />

American forces would depart Iraq in their entirety by the end of the year,<br />

USF-I continued the drawdown. On December 18, 2011, the last U.S. forces<br />

in Iraq departed. The remaining forces were reorganized under the Office of<br />

Security Cooperation–Iraq under a lieutenant general and subordinate to U.S.<br />

Embassy Iraq. The mission was declared over.<br />

Afghanistan Assessment and Adaptation<br />

This section details the historical record of the Obama administration’s assessment<br />

process and the resulting adaptation in strategy and force levels<br />

in Afghanistan in 2009. 94 It should be kept in mind that unlike the previous<br />

case study, this was a new administration, one in which routines, processes,<br />

and personalities had not yet gelled. The President campaigned, however, on<br />

an explicit platform that viewed the war in Afghanistan as a war of necessity,<br />

compared to the invasion and subsequent insurgency in Iraq. The Bush<br />

administration had conducted an exhaustive review in late 2008, recognizing<br />

that events in Afghanistan were not trending in a positive way. 95 The Afghan<br />

government did its own internal assessment and believed that nearly half of<br />

the country’s 364 districts (166) were completely or substantially controlled by<br />

the Taliban. 96 The late 2008 American review, led by Lieutenant General Douglas<br />

Lute, USA, recommended a fully resourced COIN approach and additional<br />

force levels to implement it. President Bush did not commit to a decisive shift<br />

in strategy or force levels, given pending change in administration, and deferred<br />

to the incoming President. 97<br />

Within a few weeks of taking office, President Barack Obama requested<br />

that former Central Intelligence Agency analyst Bruce Riedel conduct a quick<br />

strategic assessment of the situation in Afghanistan. 98 Riedel had recently<br />

113

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