LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Hoffman and Crowther
is no idle danger; no hypothetical threat. In the last few months alone,
we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here
from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts
of terror. And this danger will only grow if the region slides backwards,
and al Qaeda can operate with impunity. 141
The President noted that the strategy would keep the pressure on al Qaeda,
in not only the short term with U.S. forces but also the long term by increasing
the stability and capacity of partners in the region. In the end, “Our
overarching goal remains the same: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten American
and our allies in the future. . . . We must reverse the Taliban’s momentum
and deny it the ability to overthrow the government.” 142 The bumper sticker
for the strategy became “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda,” but
notably the task was expanded by reference to safe havens in Pakistan. This
became the central logic of the strategic communications plan. The strategy
was articulated further in congressional testimony that week by Cabinet officials,
143 the Chairman, 144 and the political and military leaders seeking to
execute it. 145
General McChrystal did not survive in his post long enough to see his
operational design applied. Indiscreet comments from his staff published in
Rolling Stone forced the President to accept his resignation in June 2010. 146
General Petraeus, who was appointed to replace him, continued the campaign
he had helped frame while commander of USCENTCOM.
All in all, the strategic adaptation developed for Afghanistan’s Surge was
a product of a protracted evaluation of U.S. interests, policy aims, and supporting
strategies. Some found the sessions too extended and inconclusive,
but they did include the kind of strategic discourse needed to produce a clear
strategy. 147 President Obama’s deliberate style strived to reassess U.S. policy
and strategic requirements, including fundamental assumptions. 148 Some participants
believed that the review was useful but too drawn out and reflected a
lack of Presidential commitment. 149 The President observed that he was more
engaged than was typical in deliberations and felt compelled to generate his
own option. Ironically, the administration largely ended up where the Lute
review of 2008 had finished a year earlier.
122