LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Hammes
any form of logistics or personnel support, all of which are fundamental to
forming an army. OMC-A was literally building the Afghan army’s supporting
base even as it was training and deploying the combat units of the army.
Eikenberry established Task Force (TF) Phoenix, which would use a U.S.
Army infantry brigade to train the Afghan army. 6 Indicative of the expedient
nature of the effort, OMC-A received the 2 nd Brigade of the 10 th Mountain Division
to execute its mission. The brigade consisted of the brigade headquarters,
one infantry battalion, and a logistics battalion. Upon arrival in country, it
was augmented by individuals and training teams from the Marine Corps, National
Guard, and nine different countries to form TF Phoenix. An essentially
ad hoc organization executing a mission it had not trained for, 2 nd Brigade also
had a change of command only 2 weeks before it deployed in May 2003.
The brigade took over directly from the Special Forces units. It started by
establishing a centralized training location in Kabul. Up to this point, Special
Forces Soldiers had been training small units of Afghans in the field. TF Phoenix
focused on training at the company and battalion levels while starting to
build brigade and corps staffs. However, an infantry brigade is not manned
with personnel appropriate to establish national-level institutions, so that
mission was contracted out to Military Professional Resources, Incorporated
(MPRI). By the time the brigade left in December 2003, it was sending platoons,
companies, and kandaks out to conduct operations with the 1 st Brigade
of the 10 th Mountain Division. Working with MPRI, it was also forming the
brigade and corps staffs.
During this 6-month period, the task force also handed the 4-week basic
training course over to the Afghans, supported by American advisors. During
the same period, the French ran the officers’ course, and the British ran the
noncommissioned officer (NCO) course, each of which ran separately. When
NCO and basic training courses graduated, the NCOs joined the troops and
formed companies. They worked together on small-unit tactics until the longer
officers’ course graduated, at which point the officers and the U.S.-embedded
training teams joined the companies. Three companies formed a kandak,
which began a unit-training program to prepare for combat. Given the significant
differences between the military cultures of Britain, France, and the
United States, there were inevitable issues when the officers, NCOs, and troops
began to work together. This problem was further exacerbated by the signifi-
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