LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Initial Planning and Execution in Afghanistan and Iraq
Iraqi forces inadequate by itself to bring stability to Iraq. The elections that
were pursued with great diligence also created a highly sectarian government
that expressed majority views but did nothing to protect minority rights. It
served neither U.S. interests nor the long-term welfare of the Iraqi people. In
Afghanistan, by the end of the Bush administration, years of insufficient funding
and increasing Taliban momentum left the coalition unable to clear, hold,
and build. More forces were needed quickly to provide a space to build up
the Afghan police and army forces needed for the United States to begin to
withdraw from the Hindu Kush. First in Iraq and later in Afghanistan, the addition
of more coalition forces would be necessary before the endgame could
be reached in either country.
Observations and Lessons
Lessons involving decisionmaking, intelligence and knowledge of the operational
area, and the character and conduct of war itself were encountered in
these conflicts.
Decisionmaking
Military participation in national decisionmaking is both necessary and problematic.
Part of the difficulty comes from normal civil-military tension, but
many instances in the war on terror also show unnecessary misunderstandings.
Civilian national security decisionmakers need a better understanding of
the complexity of military strategy and the military’s need for planning guidance.
Senior military officers for their part require a deep understanding of the
interagency decisionmaking process, an appreciation for the perspectives and
frames of reference of civilian counterparts, and a willingness to embrace and
not resist the complexities and challenges inherent in the system of civilian
control. 162
In a similar vein, inside the Pentagon, future senior officers also need to
study cases in wartime decisionmaking. The case of Iraq is particularly instructive.
In the run-up to Iraq, the Secretary of Defense, as is his legal prerogative,
inserted himself into the military-technical aspects of war planning
to a high, perhaps unprecedented, degree. History will judge the wisdom of
this managerial technique, but it serves as a reminder to future senior officers
71