LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Initial Planning and Execution in Afghanistan and Iraq
co-opted by President Karzai, remained independent and often toxic power
brokers. The level of international aid was not enough to stem the tide of an
insurgency designed in part to render such aid ineffective. In many areas, but
particularly in the southern and eastern parts of the country, the Taliban, from
its sanctuaries in Pakistan, covertly began to restore its infrastructure, unimpeded
by absentee or ineffective government structures.
The Situation Deteriorates, 2005–2009
From 2002 to 2005, the Taliban rebuilt its cadres with drug money, donations
from the Gulf states, extortion, and help from al Qaeda. 43 Their sanctuaries in
Pakistan enabled them to rearm and retrain. By 2005, the Quetta Shura Taliban
(led by Mullah Omar), the Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin (under Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar), and the Haqqani Network (led initially by Jalaluddin Haqqani
and his son, Sirajuddin) were all working together to subvert the Karzai regime
and wear down the coalition. All three of these groups continue to swear
at least nominal allegiance to Mullah Omar and to coordinate major plans, but
they are distinct operational entities with their own territories of interest in
Afghanistan and independent fundraising mechanisms. Mullah Omar is also
revered by the Pakistani Taliban, who have opposed Pakistan’s government
since 2006. 44 In 2005, the Afghan government’s lack of capacity and the allies’
light footprint scheme allowed many districts and a few provinces to fall under
the “shadow” control of the Taliban. Some provinces, such as poppy-rich Helmand,
had little government or coalition presence before 2006.
In 2005, encouraged by the U.S. attention to its troubled war in Iraq, the
Taliban began a nationwide offensive to regain its influence. From 2004 to
2009, there was a nine-fold increase in security incidents nationwide and a
forty-fold increase in suicide bombing, a technique imported from Iraq. Conflict
spread to most of the 34 provinces, but 71 percent of the security incidents
in 2010 still took place in only 10 percent of the more than 400 districts
nationwide. 45 The war in Afghanistan remains primarily a war over control of
Pashtun areas in the eastern and southern portion of the country, but Taliban
subversion and terrorism also became important factors in many other provinces.
Efforts to combat narcotics growth and production generally failed or
met with only temporary success. As corruption inside Afghanistan increased,
Taliban revenue increased accordingly.
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