LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Lamb with Franco
involve himself in a miniscule portion of the decisions made throughout the
national security system. Like all leaders commanding large organizations, he
must issue broad guidance and count on subordinates to implement the guidance
consistent with his intent and extant circumstances.
To make delegated authority work, there must be unity of command,
which the U.S. military considers a principle of war. The Constitution provides
for unity of command by making the President commander in chief of
the Armed Forces and chief executive of the executive branch of government.
Nevertheless, multiple forces limit the President’s ability to generate unified
effort. Problems arise when there is confusion about who is in charge of what;
when the President’s guidance is neglected or reinterpreted; and when the
President is not able to review and issue clarifying instructions in a timely
manner as circumstances evolve. These types of complications to vertical unity
of effort were evident in the war on terror at multiple levels.
Confusion about who was in charge of various efforts arose early and continued
throughout the war. President Bush was frustrated when he discovered
DOD and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) each thought the other had
the lead for operations in Afghanistan. 111 The mixup was due in part to the
nature of the nontraditional threat, which required responses from multiple
departments and agencies and raised doubts about which organization would
lead the effort. President Bush and President Obama tried to eliminate such
uncertainty by assigning “czars” in Washington or special envoys overseas to
lead interagency missions. Some argue this practice led to bureaucratic conflict
in Washington and confusion abroad about who spoke for the President. 112
In Afghanistan and Iraq, senior leader accounts suggest the performance of
czars and special envoys was mixed and changed over time. 113 L. Paul Bremer
was the most controversial such figure. Bremer’s appointment did not simplify
the President’s job. Instead, it accentuated disagreements among State,
Defense, and White House staffs about who was in the chain of command
between the President and Bremer. The origins of Bremer’s substantive policy
preferences were disputable. 114 However, what seemed clear was that Bremer
“was convinced that he worked for the President,” even though his terms of
reference stated he worked for the Secretary of Defense. 115 Senior DOD leaders
insist the confusion about Bremer’s reporting chain sidetracked the entire
mission in Iraq. 116 President Obama’s special envoy to Afghanistan and Paki-
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