LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Lamb with Franco
by the State Department, and eventually the Iraqis themselves. 69 In his memoirs,
Rumsfeld argues that he wanted State to take more responsibility for
the postwar effort (even though it was clear that the department could not
effectively do so) and notes he had recommended for months that Ambassador
L. Paul Bremer—the President’s special envoy to Iraq—report to the
President through State and not Defense. 70 He practiced what he preached,
discouraging preparations for postwar lawlessness, a four-star headquarters
to organize and oversee the occupation, and the flow of additional ground
forces to theater once victory over the Iraqi military was assured. 71 In short,
Rumsfeld was skeptical about the ability of the United States to engineer a
stable and prosperous Iraq regardless of effort, and he wanted someone else
in charge of that mission.
The Department of State, including Secretary Colin Powell and Ambassador
Bremer, did not want an extended occupation of Iraq, either; in fact,
Bremer notes it “was certain to be a short occupation.” 72 However, these leaders
believed that it would difficult to find others willing to take responsibility
for the future of Iraq and that the United States would have to do so since
it had engineered the war. After the acrimonious international debate over
deposing Saddam, it was important to stop the hemorrhaging of political support
for the war on terror, something a chaotic Iraq would accelerate and a
stable Iraq would help reduce. Thus, State wanted the speed and scale of U.S.
postwar activities commensurate with the U.S. interests at stake. It thought the
quickest way out of Iraq was to make the maximum effort to stabilize it following
the termination of large-scale fighting, which meant a large ground force
for security, plenty of development assistance, and as much international support
as could be mustered. Secretary Powell was well known for his approach
to overseas interventions, which postulated that a large force and effort early
on make them more manageable. He had no illusions about the possibility of
postwar disorder; he warned the President on just this point. Secretary Powell
and Ambassador Bremer repeatedly emphasized the importance of security
and lamented not only the unwillingness of DOD to provide more troops but
also State’s inability to provide the number, quality, and duration of civil administrators
needed to put Iraq back on its feet. 73
In short, neither State nor DOD based their approaches to postwar Iraq on
wishful thinking. On the contrary, they worried about how difficult an occu-
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