LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

How System Attributes Trumped Leadership
As an influential article further explains, in a counterinsurgency, small
units must supply key intelligence to higher commands rather than the other
way around. In large force-on-force conventional combat:
Satellites, spy planes, and more arcane assets controlled by people far
from the battlefield inform ground units about the strength, location,
and activity of the enemy before the ground unit even arrives. Information
flows largely from the top down. In a counterinsurgency, the flow
is (or should be) reversed. The soldier or development worker on the
ground is usually the person best informed about the environment and
the enemy. 259
Thus, all soldiers must collect intelligence for higher level analysts who create
“comprehensive narratives” for each area that “describe changes in the economy,
atmospherics, development, corruption, governance, and enemy activity”
to inform higher levels in the chain of command. 260
The critical importance of what came to be called “human terrain” or “the
human domain” was evident not only at the small-unit level but also in the way
U.S. leaders interacted with their host-nation counterparts. Prior to the war,
U.S. officials debated and disagreed about which Iraqi expatriates to support,
but in reality they were guessing about which ones might prove acceptable to
the Iraqi people. 261 Once U.S. forces occupied Iraq, they had to appoint local
officials without understanding the political consequences. 262 U.S. leaders were
split over whether to select a governing group for Iraq by fiat, via regional
caucuses, or through national elections. It was assumed that elected leaders
would be more legitimate, 263 but elected leaders also might be more sectarian
and desire a future for Iraq different from what the United States preferred.
Indeed, the longer we stayed in Iraq, the more we realized our objectives were
not identical with those of host-nation leaders. Having U.S. interests prevail to
the extent possible meant we had to make our relationship with host-nation
leaders “transactional and conditional,” 264 something that requires an adroit
mix of leadership, unified effort among all U.S. elements of power, and sociocultural
savvy.
Defeating the insurgents, partnering with host-nation officials, and winning
popular support all were impossible tasks without a profound under-
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