LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Hammes
DOD noted that 2007 witnessed the continued rapid growth of Iraqi security
forces, with the army reaching 194,233 trained personnel and the police
reaching 241,960, with plans to expand to over 270,000 in the military and
over 307,000 in the MOI:
The Coalition’s four main areas of emphasis in developing the MoD and
MoI and their forces remain . . . (1) developing ministerial capacity; (2)
improve the proficiency of the Iraqi forces; (3) build specific logistics,
sustainment and training capacities; and (4) support the expansion of
the MoD and MoI forces. Special problems within these areas include
corruption and lack of professionalism, sectarian bias, leader shortfalls,
logistics deficiencies, and dependence on Coalition forces for many combat
support functions. 107
The history of the U.S. Surge in Iraq has been covered extensively elsewhere
and will not be covered in detail here. Yet it is important to note that
in addition to rapidly expanding the ISF prior to and during the surge period,
MNSTC-I, during the tenure of Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, USA,
from September 2005 to June 2007, also drove quality improvements that enabled
Iraqi forces to play a key role in surge operations and hold their own
against anti-coalition forces. A strong focus on force generation paid major
dividends in this timeframe. MNSTC-I’s extensive use of the foreign military
sales program also accelerated the flow of modern military equipment to the
ISF, transforming army and police units in about 2 years from a force mounted
principally in civilian pickup trucks to one equipped with 3,200 up-armored
Humvees by the end of 2008. Entire divisions, such as the 11 th and 14 th , were
assembled and employed in action in as little as 12 months. 108 While many of
the problems cited above were not fully solved, ISF units nonetheless far outnumbered
U.S. and coalition troops, particularly in the crucial Baghdad operations,
and on the whole performed successfully. They deserve a fair portion
of credit for the eventual success of the Baghdad security plan and the major
reductions in violence that followed across Iraq.
The rapid expansion of the ISF does not tell the full story. A major success
story of the Surge was the formation of the Sons of Iraq. By late 2007, 91,000
volunteers had signed up. By mid-2008, the Washington Post reported that vio-
310