LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Collins
ized the presentation as unimaginative and unoriginal. 8 The President wanted
a plan that featured the rapid use of military force and the insertion of troops
on the ground as soon as possible.
It should be noted here that some Defense officials believed that the terrorists
likely had the help of a state sponsor and that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq
was the most likely suspect. 9 The issue of simultaneously attacking Iraq was
brought up at Camp David by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz,
but the suggestion had little support among the National Security Council
(NSC) principals and was sidelined by the President. The timing was not fortuitous.
However, on September 26, President Bush asked Rumsfeld in private
to “look at the shape of our plans on Iraq” and asked for “creative” options. 10 In
any event, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) planning for a potential
war in Iraq would begin in earnest in November 2001 before the conclusion of
the initial fighting in Afghanistan. 11
On September 21, USCENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks,
USA, briefed the President on a plan to destroy al Qaeda in Afghanistan and remove
the Taliban government. 12 Despite recent air and missile attacks against al
Qaeda in Afghanistan, USCENTCOM had no preexisting plans for conducting
ground operations there. The September 21 plan emerged after extensive dialogue,
but Secretary Rumsfeld also asked for broader plans that looked beyond
Afghanistan. 13 In all of his planning commentary, the Secretary’s stated goal
was not to seek revenge but to prevent another attack on the U.S. homeland.
However, all the participants in the briefing agreed that real-time intelligence
about Afghanistan was in short supply. 14 The plan also depended heavily on
access to facilities in nearby countries and support by U.S. airlift and sealift.
The basic concept was to put U.S. Army Special Forces and CIA operators
with Northern Alliance forces and anti-Taliban forces in the south, exploiting
the combination of U.S. airpower, tactical advice, communications, and experienced
Afghan resistance forces. 15 The plan also featured making humanitarian
food drops and, later, having U.S. and coalition conventional forces mop
up and go after the remaining Taliban and al Qaeda elements. 16 In President
Bush’s hopeful words, “We would [then begin to] stabilize the country and
help the Afghan people to build a free society.” 17
The air war and humanitarian food drops, coordinated from the Combined
Air Operations Center in Saudi Arabia, began on October 7, but Special
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