LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Collins
sectarian violence, “score settling,” and Iranian meddling. 133 Warnings on various
aspects of the plan were also made by Representative Ike Skelton (D-MO),
former USCENTCOM Commander General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.), as
well as Secretary Powell, Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), former National Security
Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and others.
In addition to a complex set of sensitive, inaccurate assumptions, another
problem—in part related to the sensitive assumptions, but at the same time
a separate issue—was the inability of the coalition and the United States to
put enough security forces—U.S., allied, or Iraqi—on the ground to control a
country the size of California and create the security needed for governance
and reconstruction. The small initial USCENTCOM combat force accepted
significant risk in its rear area, but it accomplished its mission. The forces adequate
to win the war, however, were not sufficient for providing local security,
enabling reconstruction, defeating the insurgents, or protecting the population.
General Abizaid, then USCENTCOM deputy commander, stated in a
recent interview, “I went to Baghdad right after it had been captured, and I was
shocked at how little control there was in Baghdad. I went to the [3 rd ] Division
Commander, and then I went to Lieutenant General McKiernan [Land Component
Commander Lieutenant General David McKiernan, USA] and I said,
hey you have got to get control of what’s going on in Baghdad. You may think
the war is over, but the war isn’t over yet.” 134
Sadly, while looters were demonstrating the inadequacy of the force on
hand and implicitly encouraging insurgents, General Franks, responding to an
inquiry by the Secretary of Defense, changed his mind and “off ramped” the
nearly 20,000 Soldiers of the 1 st Cavalry Division, ending its land, air, and sea
movement toward Iraq and leaving the in-country troops without reinforcements.
135 The guidance from Washington to its forces was to “take as much
risk getting out of the country as you took getting into the country.” 136 General
Abizaid concluded, “For all intents and purposes, we were still fighting in Iraq,
and everyone else was saying how glad they were that [the war] was over with.
We were going to turn it into Bosnia, except it wasn’t Bosnia, it was Iraq.” 137
DOD civilian leadership did not want to admit—perhaps for public relations
or legal reasons—that by mid-summer 2003, there was an insurgency
going on. General Abizaid, the new USCENTCOM commander, publicly and
clearly stated that there was an emerging guerrilla war there. 138 The August
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