LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Hammes
tem will show how many personnel are actually in a unit—and thus eliminate
payment to “ghost” soldiers. It will also allow for more effective accountability
of equipment and consumables such as fuel. This reduces the losses to
black market activities. Unfortunately, many Afghans, to include senior officers,
do not want this level of transparency. They require the funds acquired
through fraud to function in their organizations—and in too many cases,
simply to enrich themselves. Furthermore, the shortage of literate, numerate,
and computer-savvy personnel in the ANSF is simply insufficient to operate
and maintain these systems.
Local Police Initiatives
While not technically an element of the Afghan National Security Forces, any
discussion of Afghan security must include the various local police initiatives
that have been made across the country. The collapse of the Taliban government
left local policing in the hands of various warlords and militias. The men
who filled these jobs were not trained policemen. The United Nations’ initial
plan called for a national police force to be trained, equipped, and deployed
under lead nation supervision. Unfortunately, this project was started from a
low baseline and would inevitably take a great deal of time. With a deteriorating
security situation and insufficient ANA/ANP forces to protect the rural
population, ISAF commanders from the local to the national level turned to
militia/local men to provide security. Over the last decade, the United States
and ISAF have made several attempts to form local militia units similar to the
“Sons of Iraq” concept that was successful in that country. These local militias
were referred to as police but, if trained at all, were trained as paramilitary
units by soldiers, not policemen.
A series of programs was tried: Afghan National Auxiliary Police (2005),
Afghan Public Protection Program (2007), Community Defense Forces (2009),
Community Defense Initiative/Local Defense Initiative (2009), Interim Security
for Critical Infrastructure (2010), Village Stability Operations (2010), and
finally, consolidation under the Afghan Local Police (ALP) Program (2010). 66
Some reports from the field extolled the virtues of locally recruited police/militias.
67 Other reports have consistently detailed abuses, such as corruption, assault,
rape, and murder, by local police/militias. 68 This is inevitable in a nation
as diverse as Afghanistan where the coalition support to local programs varies
298