LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq
lence had decreased from 1,400 incidents per day to only 200. 109 With violence
decreasing to early-2005 levels, the concern among Sunnis turned to integrating
the Sons of Iraq into the official security forces of Iraq. The Shia-dominated
government was not eager to incorporate so many men who were recently
their enemies. 110 Less violence and an army and police force of over 530,000
meant the Shia also perceived much less need for the Sons of Iraq as separate
forces. They did not want them integrated into the Iraqi army. 111
Over the next year, violence continued to decrease even as U.S. forces
started to draw down. By early 2009, the steadily increasing application of resources
to raising and training the Iraqi army resulted in an army of almost
200,000, augmented by police forces of over 380,000. Operational units were
improving but still required coalition support for intelligence, communications,
engineering, and close air support. There also remained serious concerns
about the ability of the MOD and MOI to execute the full range of their
duties. While retention and recruiting looked good for meeting future goals,
the ministries’ development was slow and uneven. 112
By June 2010, Iraqi forces had grown to 625,000, and DOD believed they
were on track to achieve minimum essential capability in all areas except logistics
and sustainment, with continued problems in planning, budgeting, and
procurement. Furthermore, while the ISF would not be ready to fight an external
enemy by the December 2011 deadline for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces,
they were sufficiently prepared for internal security. 113 U.S. forces withdrew on
time, and the U.S. Government’s interest in Iraq declined precipitously until
the sudden and rapid collapse of the two Iraqi army divisions responsible for
the defense of Mosul in June 2014.
This collapse illustrated the difficulty of overcoming cultural and political
realities when building another nation’s army. With the departure of American
advisors, “the army became [former prime minister Nouri al-] Maliki’s private
militia,” 114 according to Major General Eaton. As such, it discriminated against
non-Shia, often functioning as an enforcement arm of Shiite political parties.
The political reality for the Sunni in particular meant that the Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) might in fact be the lesser of two evils. The U.S. advisory
effort was unable to change the culture of the Iraqi army. David Zucchina
of the Los Angeles Times reported, “Officers in one of many units that collapsed
in Mosul, the 2d Battalion of Iraq’s 3d Federal Police Division, said their U.S.
311