LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Hoffman and Crowther
tion about defeating the Taliban to succeed in Afghanistan as opposed to clear
delineation of national interests, policy, and options. While the ISAF review
proved quite impressive, it lacked a broad enough charter and representation
to be the basis for subsequent NSC deliberations. Further study is warranted
to determine if future theater commands should be tasked to undertake such
strategic assessments given their priorities and largely military structure.
Collaborative Information-sharing Environment. In this portion of the
Afghanistan case study, we found limitations stemming from Pentagon practices
in framing options and a desire by DOD and the Joint Staff to unite behind
the theater command’s assessment and strategy rather than explore different
missions and different strategies. The President’s desire for disciplined
debate, his request for options, and his explicit discomfort with early portions
of the debate suggest that information-sharing was limited. The President’s
reaching out to his staff and to the Vice Chairman to gain additional insights
and to push for more constrained options suggest that this component of the
process was not fully satisfied.
Additionally, there is considerable agreement among participants that the
candor and trust levels were corrupted early in the process and negatively impacted
the decisionmaking process. On several occasions, speeches, leaks, and
comments to the media or Congress inadvertently created the impression that
the military was maneuvering the President into a box. 200 Civil-military relations
are abetted by an open and professional tenor, which results in quality
discourse and sound policy decisions and strategies. 201 This discourse is best
achieved in a climate of trust and candor, but this decision process was colored
by a lack of trust.
Strategic Coordination. In the case of Afghanistan initially, the NSC was
not aware of confusion over the mission, resource gaps, or inconsistent objectives.
However, with the personal involvement and pushing of the President,
discrete policy options were developed and debated. Ultimately, again with
the deliberate engagement of the President, a consensus between competing
factions on both the aim and ways of a strategy were hashed out.
If there were weak spots in the Surge adaptation, the new approach did
not create additional political leverage and conditionality for Karzai to reform
his government and mitigate levels of corruption and incompetence. There is
little doubt that security would be enhanced and that additional time could be
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