LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Initial Planning and Execution in Afghanistan and Iraq
stronger every year since 2005, and incentives for fence-sitting increased,
along with fear and disgust at government corruption. 63
In the Bush years, the lack of progress came at a price: 630 U.S. Servicemembers
died, and the United States spent $29 billion in Afghanistan on security
assistance, counternarcotics, economic development, and humanitarian
assistance. With the Iraq effort finally back on a more solid footing, President
Bush’s deputy national security advisor, Lieutenant General Douglas Lute,
USA, conducted an assessment of the campaign in Afghanistan. He concluded
that more troops and resources were needed, but in the final days of the administration,
the President decided quietly to pass the Lute assessment on to
the Obama administration. He decided that “the new strategy would have a
better chance of success if we gave the new team an opportunity to revise it as
they saw fit and then adopt it as their own.” 64
In early 2009, Ambassador Eikenberry returned to Kabul and noticed the
changes in Afghanistan since his departure as the military commander there
in 2007. He opined that the security situation deteriorated, especially in the
south; training of the army and police lagged; the challenge of the Pakistani
sanctuary had increased; and the level of mistrust between President Karzai
and the United States was peaking, as was Afghan government corruption,
complicated by a glut of foreign aid and assistance. Ambassador Eikenberry
found the Taliban “enjoying increasing amounts of political support inside of
Afghanistan.” 65
We now turn to the conflict in Iraq, beginning with a short comparison of
the two campaigns.
Comparing the Two Campaigns
The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq had significant commonalities and differences.
66 Both began as conventional conflicts with the aim of regime change.
Both turned into protracted insurgencies compounded by nation-building
activities. In Afghanistan, U.S. Army Special Forces on horseback calling in
close air support might seem highly unconventional, but when considering
the whole picture—Afghan infantry and cavalry facing entrenched Taliban
fighters along well-established frontlines, air support, coalition activity, and
so forth—the initial campaign that culminated by December 2001 with the
capture of Mazar-e-Sharif, Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and Jalalabad was, on
41