LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Raising and Mentoring Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq
widely. In addition, in those areas with mixed populations with longstanding
animosities, the police/militias are seen as another source of power in local
conflicts. Even Special Forces teams living with the locals are hard-pressed to
understand the local politics well enough to ensure a neutral security force.
Despite these challenges, the policy of having Special Forces teams live with
ALP units resulted in major improvements in their performance and professionalism.
The teams dedicated a great deal of effort to vetting the individual
militia members through local community leaders. This effort, plus their continued
mentoring and presence, ensured that the ALP provided better security
than the numerous previous programs.
However, significant problems remained, in particular the difficulty of assuring
the loyalty of ALP units to the government or their adherence to their
function as neutral enforcers of the law rather than as partisan militia in local
disputes. As a result, the U.S. Embassy in Kabul forbade U.S. diplomats from
meeting with tribal leaders to discuss tribal “pacts,” ruling out on-the-ground
contact with local defense groups concerning counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
chiefly out of concern that local defense groups might spur intertribal
conflict and eventually oppose the national government. 69
Each of the problems with the ALP has been magnified by the withdrawal
of the Special Forces advisors. In some areas, Special Forces were replaced by
Afghan special forces teams, which simply lack the resources available to their
U.S. counterparts. Because the ALP lacks supporting institutions to provide
pay, equipment, fuel, spare parts, and ammunition, some have been forced to
turn to extortion to survive. 70
Continuing Problems
From the beginning, the police training program has suffered from a number
of significant problems. Insufficient manning, disagreement over the police
mission, corruption, and the weakness of the justice system have degraded the
program since its inception. The GAO’s Afghanistan Security Report of March
2009 noted CSTC-A was short over 1,500 police trainers. 71 Three years later, a
subsequent GAO report noted ANP instructor manning levels still reflected a
46.5 percent shortage. 72 Despite the increased focus on ANSF development by
successive ISAF commanders—General McChrystal, General David Petraeus,
USA, General John Allen, USMC, and General Joseph Dunford, USMC—
299