LESSONS ENCOUNTERED

Lamb with Franco
that executed the attacks, namely, al Qaeda? The answers to these questions
carried major implications for the type of effort the United States would have
to mount and the resources required. Answers to these questions would determine
whether an extended war in Afghanistan and intervention in Iraq were
necessary, and whether state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran, or states such
as North Korea with weapons of mass destruction that carried out terror attacks,
had to be defeated or otherwise engaged. The more broadly the problem
was defined, the greater the effort required to solve it.
In the short period between the 9/11 attacks and President Bush’s speech
to Congress on September 20, 14 the administration settled on an expansive
and somewhat artful phrase to depict the scope of the security threat. President
Bush declared, “Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every
government that supports them. Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda,
but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global
reach has been found, stopped and defeated [emphasis added].” Conjoining
terrorists and state sponsors broadened the scope of the war well past al Qaeda.
Moreover, in this same speech, and often thereafter, the President cast the
struggle in terms of freedom and tyranny, between those “who believe in progress
and pluralism, tolerance and freedom” and those who do not. The President’s
definition of the problem and the enemies to overcome was broad but
limited by two clarifications. The expression “axis of evil” defined the short list
of noteworthy state sponsors of terrorism as Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. 15 The
other limitation was the expression “global reach.” This description indicated
that only terrorist groups capable of attacking the United States had to be destroyed,
rather than all terrorist groups, many of which had narrower agendas
that did not directly threaten the Nation.
A key predicate of President Bush’s approach was the belief that successful
terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction would be calamitous. One
senior administration official later explained that the President’s strategy was
broadly preventive and not narrowly punitive because senior leaders assumed
they were at war with a global network, that the terrorists were bent on mass
destruction rather than just political theater, and finally that sustaining a series
of 9/11-type attacks “could change the nature of our country.” 16 The dire
consequences of such an attack required the United States to take the offensive,
including preemptive military action and other extraordinary measures even
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