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QUANTUM METAPHYSICS - E-thesis

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observations. Since theory was merely a symbolic device for systematising observations, the<br />

essence of the task it performs is not to present and explain reality. In the interests of scientific<br />

realism, ”models” are considered as steps towards theories which are representative of reality<br />

and ”model building” is the first phase in a search for a truthful theory. The antagonism between<br />

these positions is as old as systematic science. In his time, Plato set astronomers the task of<br />

discovering a group of geometric assumptions which would reduce the motions of heavenly<br />

bodies to circular movements. For 2000 years, this Instrumentalist principle for rescuing<br />

phenomena became an ideal for the formation of astronomical theories. In general terms, the<br />

birth of modern-era natural science signified the triumphal march of Realism. 353<br />

Instrumentalism has also appeared in the modern era in different forms in the philosophy of,<br />

among others, George Berkeley, John Stuart Mill, Ernst Mach, Pierre Duhem and Henri<br />

Poincaré. 354 Duhem refused to accept that scientific theories are able to explain anything, since it<br />

was his view that explanation inextricably connected science with the metaphysics. Also,<br />

Descriptivists such as Hume and Mach restricted the task of science to the portrayal of observed<br />

phenomena, science was only for providing descriptive answers to questions of ”How?”, never<br />

answers to questions such as ”Why?” which sought explanations. In science, descriptions of<br />

phenomena were to be attempted in the most economical way possible. Pierre Duhem’s scientific<br />

ideals were closely akin to Conventionalism, which Henri Poincaré formulated in the first decade<br />

of the 1900s. According to this doctrine, scientific theories were, in the last resort, agreements<br />

whose truth or falcity it was not meaningful to discuss. Observations were always compatible<br />

with competing theories, so choices between different theories were based on a search for<br />

appropriateness. For example, Copernicus’ heliocentric system was not better than the Ptolemaic<br />

earth-centred system because it was either true or closer to reality, only because it was<br />

mathematically less complicated. 356<br />

The Austrian physicist and philosopher Ernst Mach (1838-1915) accepted neither atomic theory<br />

or Mechanistic materialism. His response was Phenomenalism, according to which senseperceptions<br />

were the ”elements” of reality. Physical objects were nothing more than ”collections<br />

of sense-experiences”. As a Positivist, Mach believed that ”scientific theory must not go beyond<br />

the theory of gravitation. See further J.S. Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism. Trubner, London 1865, 57-58.<br />

353 Niiniluoto 11980, 228-229.<br />

354 Niiniluoto 1980, 230-231. In recent times, philosophers such as John Dewey, Moritz Schlick, Gilbert Ryle and<br />

Stephen Toulmin have made representations in favour of Instrumentalism, and some scientists, especially in the<br />

fields of physics and economics, have also adopted the doctrine.<br />

133

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