QUANTUM METAPHYSICS - E-thesis

world of matter, different mental contents such as knowledge, feelings and models of behaviour
can be shaped according to specific possibilities permissible at the ”quantum level” which are
then realised in differing ways in each individual according to their particular composition,
according to the surrounding environment, according to developments which have already taken
place, and following choices which have already been made.
It is clear that mental states cannot ever be wholly observed or completely known any more than
this is possible with the other quantum states investigated by physics. Regardless of their specific
“transcendentalism”, quantum states do however have a concrete influence on the shaping of the
material world. Also, possibilities contained within the structural composition of the mind can, in
different circumstances and through differing interactions, be realised in the observable world in
differing ways. Different mental states can clearly have a varying degree of observable influence
on the world of matter: part of the internal structure of our minds need not necessary exert any
external influence. Some quantum states may present in certain position in space, some are
perhaps only found in some people’s minds. In the state-function representation, mental states do
not have to be just brain events even though the two may be closely and lawfully connected. In
this kind of frame of reference, the functionalist approach of cognitive science could be truly
combined with the biological levels of description employed in neuroscience. 828
State functions are inseparably connected with phenomena that occur in the world of matter, but
they cannot be completely reduced to material processes or to directly-measurable objective
qualities. In principle, their relationship to the ”mental world” can be of a similar kind. In the
quantum frame of reference, physical and psychic entities do not have to be returnable to each
other, both are rather just different presentations of quantum states. Handling the contents of the
mind with state-functions does not require any type of artificial truncation. All the elements and
influences that we believe exist in someone’s mind can be included in a quantum state that
describes a given situation. Within such a framework, differing mental states, memories or
feelings can be spoken of as being comparatively independent and might also be connectable to
certain observable physiological influences, but, for example, the problem of where such states
should be permanently localised does not have to be a problem any greater than that of where
other attributes not manifested in certain situations should be located.
828 The mechanical and causal biological explanations and functional explanations of cognitive science are based on
partly-incompatible presuppositions or background assumptions: functionalism denies the relevancy of biological
levels of description. Revonsuo 2001, 81.
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